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“A sense of injustice could serve as a signal that moves us, but a 
signal does demand critical examination, and there has to be 




In 2001, a committee at the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) began discussions on two topics that had long been at the periphery 
of the global intellectual property system: folklore and traditional
knowledge.2 A third topic—demands for recognition and protection of
genetic resources in the patent system—also became part of the mandate
of this new Intergovernmental Committee (IGC).  The new subject matter
came to be known by a fairly impenetrable set of initials: GRTKF 
(genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and folklore).  To make things 
even more obscure, folklore is a term that has fallen out of favor and is 
now rarely used by itself.  Instead, those involved in the IGC discussions 
of GRTKF refer to folklore as “traditional cultural expressions” (TCE). 
That terminological disconnect is itself indicative of the definitional 
instabilities in this field.  For the discussion here, we can work from 
rough understandings of the subject matter—starting with the most 
familiar of these concepts: folklore.  Folklore includes traditional music,
1. AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, at viii (2009). 
2. See World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Rep. of the Intergovernmental 
Comm. on Intellectual Prop. and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and 
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dances, stories, rituals, insignia, arts and crafts, sculptural forms,
architectural forms, et cetera.  Traditional cultural expression covers the 
same waterfront of human expression, but is now regarded as a more
neutral, less quaint term than folklore.3 
“Traditional knowledge” is a less familiar concept.  Some commentators
use this phrase to refer to all that is known and expressed by traditional
groups, including traditional cultural expressions.4  Conversely, some 
commentators and policymakers have defined folklore to include all
traditional knowledge.5  Again, it seems best to avoid these fairly jejune
terminological debates.  Here, as in most current WIPO discussions,
traditional knowledge is used to refer to indigenous and local technologies— 
typically diagnostic, therapeutic, horticultural, predictive, or related to 
engineering with natural materials.  Traditional knowledge (TK) is the 
local wisdom that chewing a specific leaf relieves headaches, that fibers
3. See Hugh C. Hansen et al., Panel II: The Law and Policy of Protecting 
Folklore, Traditional Knowledge, and Genetic Resources, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 753, 756 (2001) (discussing reasons against use of the term folklore). 
4. See, e.g., WIPO, Information Brochure, Towards the Establishment of a 
Regional Framework for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, Traditional Cultural 
Expressions and Genetic Resources in the Caribbean Region, A3:L434E (2008), 
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtk_kin_08/wipo_grtk_kin_ 
08_caribbean_brochure.pdf (“‘Traditional knowledge’ in its broadest sense includes
knowledge and ‘expressions of folklore’ (or TCEs).  For the purpose of this brochure, 
however, TK refers to the content or substance of traditional know-how, skills and 
learning whereas TCEs refers to tangible and intangible forms of expressing knowledge 
and culture.”); David R. Hansen, Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Trade Barriers 
and the Public Domain, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 757, 759 (2010–2011) (calling
cultural expressions a “small subset” of “traditional knowledge,” but recognizing current
use in WIPO and World Trade Organization (WTO) discussions); id. at 765 (same); 
Stephen R. Munzer & Kal Raustiala, The Uneasy Case for Intellectual Property Rights 
in Traditional Knowledge, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37, 48 (2009). 
5. See, e.g., Bangui Agreement Relating to the Creation of an African Intellectual
Property Organization, Constituting a Revision of the Agreement Relating to the 
Creation of an African and Malagasy Office of Industrial Property, Annex VII, art. 46, 
Mar. 2, 1977 [hereinafter Bangui Agreement of March 2, 1977], available at http://www.
wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/details.jsp?treaty_id=227 (defining folklore for some
provisions as including “scientific knowledge and works” as well as “technological 
knowledge and works,” and “metallurgical and textile industries” and “agricultural 
techniques”); P.V. Valsala G. Kutty, WIPO, National Experiences with the Protection of 
Expressions of Folklore/Traditional Cultural Expressions: India, Indonesia and the
Philippines, at 9, WIPO/GRTKF/STUDY/1 (Nov. 25, 2002), available at http://www. 
wipo.int/tk/en/studies/cultural/expressions/study/kutty.pdf (defining folklore as including
“folk medicines” and “folk technology” and reasoning that “based on the characteristics





















      
of a particular plant have a particular tensile strength for bows, and that 
particular weather is likely to follow particular cloud formations in a
particular place.6 
An easy way to understand the distinction between TK and TCE, but 
one that feeds into preconceived Western categories, is that TCEs are in 
the realm of copyright and trademarks while TK roughly maps onto that 
which would be patentable were it novel and nonobvious instead of 
being traditional.  As with copyright, trademark, and patent, there can be 
some overlap between TCE and TK.  We have both TCE and TK when a 
ritual pipe-smoking ceremony involves smoke with actual, intended
pharmacological effects.  One simple example might help: a rain dance
is TCE, but if the rain dance works—if it actually triggers precipitation 
in a cause and effect relationship—it is also TK.7 
These two topics involve discussions of new, positive intellectual
property norms to protect the subject matter in question.  In contrast, the 
genetic resources discussion is essentially one about limiting or conditioning 
intellectual property rights.  The main argument is that patentable 
innovations that use genetic resources should be patentable only when
there is both prior informed consent and appropriate benefit sharing with 
the peoples or land that contributed the raw genetic material.  What links 
the genetic resources debate to discussions about TK and TCE is that all 
three involve rights, remuneration, and respect for inputs to innovation 
that are typically taken for granted. 
At the time of this writing, the IGC negotiations in Geneva have 
continued for over a decade with no workable system yet in sight.  And it is
particularly because there is not yet a probable outcome that the space
may exist for a more reflective analysis on whether the protection of
TK/TCE sought by the demandeurs can be justified.  Many commentators
have offered particular justifications, and a few commentators—notably 
Stephen Munzer and Kal Raustiala8—have undertaken more systematic 
efforts to apply Western traditional justifications of intellectual property
to non-Western traditional knowledge and cultural expressions.  Some of
what I will say here concurs with Munzer and Raustiala, although I may
6. Traditional knowledge is local wisdom; as linguist David Crystal puts it, “all
over the world, encounters with indigenous peoples bring to light a profound awareness 
of fauna and flora, rocks and soils, climatic cycles and their impact on the land, the 
interpretation of landscape, and the whole question of the balance of natural forces.” 
DAVID CRYSTAL, LANGUAGE DEATH 46–47 (2000). 
7. See WIPO, Booklet No. 2, Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge, at 
4–5, WIPO Pub. No. 920(E) (June 27, 2005), available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
freepublications/en/tk/920/wipo_pub_920.pdf (“A traditional tool may embody TK but 
also may be seen as a cultural expression in itself by virtue of its design and ornamentation.”). 
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reach similar conclusions via different pathways.  Along the way, I will 
try to discuss the concerns of someone who has been involved in the 
negotiations and has spent a fair amount of time listening to what 
proponents of TK/TCE protection believe they are advocating.
Part II of this Article will provide a very brief overview of theories 
used to justify intellectual property, the brevity corresponding to the 
reader’s likely familiarity with these accounts.  Part III then surveys the
history of international discussions on the protection of TK/TCE as well 
as the narrative on misappropriation and exploitation that motivates the 
demandeurs.  That discussion concludes with the fundamental questions 
or issues that negotiators have realized will make or break any system 
for protection of TK/TCE. 
These key issues inevitably resurface when we attempt, in Part IV, to 
apply accepted theories and justifications for intellectual property to the
subject matter of TK/TCE.  Not surprisingly, traditional incentive and
welfare-maximizing theories for intellectual property fit uneasily with
TK/TCE; labor-desert theories probably do not fare any better, but that 
will depend on one’s understanding of the object of desert.  And in
contrast to incentive theories for the production and commercialization
of intellectual property, incentives for preservation and conservation of 
TK/TCE might provide some support for intellectual property rights in
this realm.  Justifications for intellectual property based on personality,
personhood, or autonomy can work for TK/TCE—as can privacy
justifications, at least for some TK/TCE. 
Part V then turns to redistributive and fairness concerns, proposing
that these may be the best philosophical justifications for protection of 
TK/TCE.  This account of protection of TK/TCE is likely part of a larger 
chunk of thinking, which Robert Merges and I have discussed—that the 
relationship of intellectual property to redistributive concerns is largely
overlooked or misunderstood.  Rotating through these different possible 
grounds for protection of TK/TCE is compatible with Michael Walzer’s
proposal that distinct areas of our lives can be governed by distinct 
principles of justice,9 as well as Amartya Sen’s belief that decisions can 
be taken and policies adopted on the basis of multiple foundations that 
are mutually reinforcing without any one principle being dominant.10 
9. See generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM
AND EQUALITY (1983). 
10. Sen calls this “plural grounding” and describes it as being the notion that 





























In considering whether there are good theories to justify protection of 
TK/TCE, we are clearly not working on a project about ideally just
social institutions.  In contrast, this is an exercise in what Sen would call
“determining whether a particular social change would enhance justice.”11 
This is a project in nyaya—the “lives that people are actually able to
lead”—versus the fundamental organizational justice of niti, akin to the 
idealized projects that have occupied much of Anglo-American
philosophy.12 
As a practical project, crafting workable international protection of 
TK/TCE will be threading a needle.  If the needle can be thread, the
resulting intellectual property rights could protect meaningful privacy
interests, provide marginal incentives for preservation of TK/TCE, and 
serve the ends of distributive justice in a modest way.  But even then, we
may still conclude that legal protection of TK/TCE would produce so
many adverse side effects that the game is not worth the candle. 
II. FAMILIAR THEORIES TO JUSTIFY INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS
There are plenty of theories, justifications, and plain old accounts of 
intellectual property.  There have also been some concise reviews of
these many theories, including distinctly valuable projects by Peter Menell13 
and William Fisher.14  Menell provides a simple taxonomy: utilitarian 
theories and everything else.15  Menell’s goal was to describe all the
schools of thought that bear on intellectual property, not merely the theories 
that are considered as providing justifications for intellectual property in
its present forms.  Fisher’s project is more limited: Fisher groups the 
varied positive accounts of intellectual property into four clusters,16 a 
topology I will use here. 
different grounds, and yet not agree on one particular ground as being the dominant 
reason for the diagnosis of injustice.” SEN, supra note 1, at 2 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
11. Id. at ix. 
12. Id. at xv. 
13. See Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: CIVIL LAW AND ECONOMICS 129 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & 
Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). 
14. See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE 
LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). 
15. See Menell, supra note 13, passim (natural rights/labor theory, unjust enrichment,
personhood theory, Libertarian theories, distributive justice, democratic theories, radical/ 
Socialist theories, and ecological theories).
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A.  Green Eyeshade Accounts (That Is, Incentives)
The “incentive” justifications that provide the high-profile undergirding
of American copyright and patent law are the most visible part of 
utilitarian and welfare-maximizing theories of intellectual property.17  As 
Peter Menell writes, “Utilitarian theorists generally endorsed the 
creation of intellectual property rights as an appropriate means to foster
innovation, subject to the caveat that such rights are limited in duration 
so as to balance the social welfare loss of monopoly exploitation.”18  By
varying the assumptions as to human and institutional behavior, markets,
and information, utilitarian theories can produce a wide range of 
recommendations for systems of “exclusive privilege”—to use John
Stuart Mill’s phrase19—to motivate innovation and the diffusion of that
innovation.  For the purposes of this Article, it is important to remember
that (1) the incentive element from the exclusive rights or privilege may
apply across the entire timeline of intellectual property—conception,
development, commercialization, preservation—and (2) the rational agent 
who is the subject of the incentives can be someone other than private
individuals.
B.  Labor Theory Accounts 
Sitting close to the incentive justifications are “labor theory”
justifications, almost always traced back to John Locke20 and richly 
explored in the literature, including by many of the participants of this 
conference.21  Labor theory justifications “sit close” to incentive
17. Id. (“References to the role of intellectual-property rights in stimulating the 
production of socially valuable works riddle American law.”). 
18. Menell, supra note 13, at 129. 
19. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 112 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1991) (1859). 
20. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 27, at 328–29 (Peter Laslett 
ed., New Am. Library 1965) (1690). 
21. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and 
the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992); Justin Hughes, Locke’s 1694
Memorandum (and More Incomplete Copyright Historiographies), 27 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 555 (2010); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. 
L.J. 287, 296–330 (1988) [hereinafter Hughes, Philosophy]; David McGowan, Copyright 
Nonconsequentialism, 69 MO. L. REV. 1 (2004); Robert P. Merges, Locke for the
Masses: Property Rights and the Products of Collective Creativity, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1179 (2008) [hereinafter Merges, Locke for the Masses]; Robert P. Merges, Locke 
Remixed ;-), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1259 (2007); see also Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the 



















   




    
    
 
 
   
     
justifications because the two have many similar assumptions and are 
usually compatible but remain quite different, particularly if the labor 
justification is seen as a labor-desert theory or rooted in natural law.22 
This cluster of accounts also has a rich vein of legislative and judicial 
pronouncements in American law supporting it as an intended foundation 
for American intellectual property law.23 
C.  Personality Accounts 
The accounts of intellectual property in Fisher’s third cluster try to
justify intellectual property as a means to maximize human development 
and flourishing.  Different “personality” or “personhood” theories, “derived
loosely from the writings of Kant and Hegel,” reason that exclusive 
rights over expression are an appropriate mechanism to enhance the
individual person’s development and general human flourishing.24  These
justifications sit within a larger body of work across an ideological
spectrum from Margaret Jane Radin to Richard Pipes that sees property
in all forms as contributing to personality, autonomy, and individual
identity.25 
Students of intellectual property law know that personality justifications
apply best to the subject matter of copyright, but even if inventors do not
“express” themselves in their innovations, those innovations may still be 
significant to the inventor’s self-perception.26  Even within copyright, it
22. Locke’s theory is commonly identified as a “natural law” theory, but people 
differ on this point and it appears to many that for Locke, property after the 
establishment of government and the introduction of currency is no longer based on 
natural rights.  See JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND HIS 
ADVERSARIES 99, 123 (1980); Thomas Scanlon, Nozick on Rights, Liberty, and Property, 
6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 6, 23 (1976). 
23. Fisher notes a “durable and widespread popular commitment in the United
States to a labor-desert theory of property.”  William W. Fisher III, Geistiges Eigentum— 
Ein Ausufernder Rechtsbereich: Die Geschichte des Ideenschutzes in den Vereinigten 
Staaten, in EIGENTUM IM INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICH: 18.–20. Jahrhundert 265, 277
(Hannes Siegrist & David Sugarman eds., 1999) (Ger.), translated in William W.
Fisher III, The Growth of Intellectual Property: A History of the Ownership of Ideas in 
the United States, BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y HARV. U. 12,  http://cyber.
law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2013); see also  BRUCE 
W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 108 (1967) (noting 
“overtones of the natural law concept” in early American copyright laws). 
24. Fisher, supra note 14, at 171–72. 
25. See  RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 65 (1999) (arguing that
acquisitiveness and, therefore, the institution of property is “intimately connected with 
the human personality by promoting a sense of identity and competence”); MARGARET 
JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993); Margaret J. Radin, Property and 
Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). 
26. I make the same argument in Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists 
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is widely thought that personality justifications are much more visible in 
continental droit d’auteur systems than Anglo-American copyright.  But 
anyone who thinks that personhood justifications are alien to American
copyright law has overlooked a rich vein of materials, both before and
after Justice Holmes’s seminal 1903 evocation of personality as a measure 
of originality in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.27 
D.  Culture Accounts 
Fisher also identifies a fourth cluster of theories that reason that
intellectual property “can and should be shaped so as to help foster the 
achievement of a just and attractive culture.”28  Fisher lumps Jefferson, 
Marx, the Legal Realists, and quite a few present day academics, including 
himself, in this group.29  Obviously, there is some overlap here between
theories that see intellectual property as a means to produce an attractive 
culture and intellectual property as a means to maximize cultural utility; 
there is also overlap between theories that see intellectual property as a
mechanism to maximize social utility or cultural robustness and theories 
that intellectual property should maximize individual “flourishing.”30 
E.  The Usefulness of These Ideas and Others 
It is difficult to disagree with Fisher’s assessment that “the prescriptive 
powers of all four [clusters of] arguments are sharply limited”31 and that
“[s]erious difficulties attend efforts to extract from any one of these 
approaches answers to concrete doctrinal problems.”32  Moreover, these 
four clusters by no means exhaust all the reasons one could give to justify
intellectual property rights.  Courts, unlike academics, seem to give greater
27. 188 U.S. 239, 249–50 (1903). 
28. Fisher, supra note 14, at 172. 
29. In addition to himself, Fisher would include Rosemary Coombe, Niva Elkin-
Koren, Michael Madow, Neil Netanel, and the late Keith Aoki. Id. at 172–73 (citing
Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property 
Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853 (1990–1991); Niva Elkin-Koren, 
Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The Case
Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
345 (1995); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1659, 1744–94 (1988); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image:
Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125 (1993)). 
30. See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996). 
31. Fisher, supra note 14, at 194. 



















weight to privacy concerns, custom, tradition, and fairness in intellectual 
property discussions. 
Of these, fairness is an extremely powerful, freestanding force in the
intellectual property discourse of courts and legislators in a way that is 
not found in late twentieth and early twenty-first century legal academic 
literature.  We might speculate that appeals to fairness can help a judge 
avoid reversal, but that fairness itself does not give the legal scholar 
much to write about—notwithstanding John Rawls and his progeny. 
III. THE LONG WINDING ROAD OF TK/TCE 
At the international level, the struggle over legal protection of TK/TCE
cleaves nicely into two parts: before and after the 1994 Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), with the
latter era beginning in earnest in 2001—the year when TK/TCE became 
a serious subject of discussions in both the WIPO and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).33  Before reviewing these developments, we should 
keep in mind the problem, or problems, that demandeurs seek to address 
through legal protection of TK/TCE. 
A.  A Real but Amorphous Problem 
There is no question that there has been a history of “outsiders”— 
whether foreigners or Western-educated local elites—studying indigenous
or local communities, then appropriating or misappropriating elements 
from those indigenous or traditional societies.  That history began with 
the earliest cultural exchanges and took on particularly egregious 
characteristics during the colonial empires of European powers.  Indeed
the exploitation, real and perceived, of colonial times still colors attitudes
toward Western researchers, so much so that linguist David Crystal 
noted in 2000 that “[e]conomic exploitation is so common that it is only 
natural for a community to assume that a Western investigator is there to
make money out of them.”34 
As Crystal’s comment indicates, the narrative that all-interactions-are-
exploitation remains strong among those who advocate TK/TCE 
33. On the WTO side, the 2001 Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration instructed “the 
Council for TRIPS, in pursuing its work programme . . . to examine, inter alia, the relationship
between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, the protection of
traditional knowledge and folklore, and other relevant new developments raised by members 
pursuant to Article 71.1.”  World Trade Organization [WTO], Ministerial Declaration of 14 
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002), available at http://www.wto. 
org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm#trips. 
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protection.35  But the situations that fall under the general description of 
outsiders appropriating TK/TCE from indigenous people and local 
communities are more varied and often more complex. 
In the case of knowledge or know-how, there has been a history of 
researchers, both from developed and developing countries, gaining insights
from indigenous people and local communities, then converting those 
insights—often through substantial additional research and development
—into “technology.”36 Sometimes the transfer of an indigenous
community’s insight into a modern technology is direct; an example of 
fairly direct transfer is a South African research institute’s isolation of
the appetite suppressant P57 from the Hoodia cactus—research based on
traditional knowledge held by San and other indigenous people in
southern Africa.37  Another example is the blue evergreen hydrangea, a
plant that has been used as an antimalarial in Chinese traditional 
medicine since the Han dynasty (206 B.C.E.–220 C.E.).38  Isolation of
the root’s active agent, halofuginone, has established that it halts the
production of the amino acid proline, the absence of which inhibits the 
development of rogue T-cells.39  Through this mechanism, halofuginone 
is expected to be effective as an antimalarial.40 
At other times, TK may produce dead ends,41 or the resulting technology 
may be different from what the traditional knowledge would have been
35. See id. 
36. INDIAN DEP’T INDUS. POLICY & PROMOTION, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND 
THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION: COUNTRY 
POSITION PAPER 1 (2011) (India), available at http://dipp.nic.in/English/Country_
Position_Paper/discussionPaper_TK_ 25Apr2011.pdf (giving examples of “revocation of
patent on wound healing properties of Turmeric in 1997 at the US Patent and Trade 
Marks Office and the revocation of patent for antifungal properties of Neem at the 
European Patent Office in 2005”). 
37. See Robert L. Ostergard et al., Between the Sacred and the Secular: Indigenous 
Intellectual Property, International Markets and the Modern African State, 44 J. MOD. 
AFR. STUD. 309, 324–26 (2006). 
38. See Tracy L. Keller et al., Halofuginone and Other Febrifugine Derivatives 
Inhibit Prolyl-tRNA Synthetase, 8 NATURE CHEMICAL BIOLOGY 311, 311 (2012) 
(acknowledging that the blue evergreen hydrangea has been used as an antimalarial for
roughly 2,000 years in traditional Chinese medicine); Dan Morrell, Han Healing: An 
Ancient Herbal Remedy, HARV. MAG., May–June 2012, at 10, 10, available at http://
harvardmagazine.com/2012/05/an-ancient-herbal-remedy. 
39. Morrell, supra note 38, at 11. 
40. Id. at 11–12. 
41. For example, the medicinal herb Ch’ang Shan was used for centuries in 
traditional Chinese medicine as an antimalarial, prompting the isolation of active alkaloids
















    
  
 
   
 












considered to have “taught” if it were treated as “prior art.”42  For  
example, rosy periwinkle is often held up as an example of the TK and
genetic resources of a developing country—in this narrative, Madagascar— 
that were exploited for modern medical technology without compensation
to the home country.43  But once one scratches beneath the surface, the 
story seems more complicated.  The plant, while endemic to Madagascar, 
was naturalized and cultivated throughout the tropics and subtropics44— 
the varieties used for the Western research may not have come from 
Madagascar at all.45  Rosy periwinkle was referenced in ancient and 
medieval literature for its medicinal properties and had a reputation in 
ninteenth- and twentieth-century traditional medicine—perhaps in multiple
countries—as a treatment for a range of ailments from wasp stings to
malaria to diabetes.46  Research established that the plant’s active 
compounds had no effect on blood sugar, but vinblastine sulfate and
G. Robert Coatney et al., Studies in Human Malaria: XXV. Trial of Febrifugine, an 
Alkaloid Obtained from Dichroa Febrifuga Lour., Against the Chesson Strain of Plasmodium 
Vivax, 9 J. NAT’L MALARIA SOC’Y 183, 183 (1950).  Eventual human testing found that 
while the more powerful of the alkaloids had efficacy as an antimalarial, in effective
doses it is “very poorly tolerated by the human host and its emetic action makes its use
impractical.” Id. at 186. 
42. Viewing the problem this way is not privileging patent law and its concepts
any more than is already done in the IGC discourse where it is understood that TK may
be protected “negatively” by viewing it as prior art that should limit patenting. 
43. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 128–29 (1996); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: 
The Appropriation of the Scientific and Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local
Communities, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 919, 922 (1996). 
44. Catharanthus Roseus, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catharanthus_ 
roseus (last visited Jan. 5, 2013) (“Catharanthus roseus (Madagascar Periwinkle) is a 
species of Catharanthus native and endemic to Madagascar. . . .  It is also however widely
cultivated and is naturalised in subtropical and tropical areas of the world.”).
45. See Manisha A. Desai, The Rosy Periwinkle: Myth, Fact and the Role of 
Independent Scientific Research, INT’L FED’N PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS & ASS’NS
(May 11, 2011), http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/content/Events/Pharma_Forums/11_May
_2011/Presentation_Eli_Lilly.pdf. 
46. Rosy Periwinkle: Vinca Rosea, HERBS2000.COM, http://www.herbs2000.com/ 
herbs/herbs_periwinkle.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2013) (describing how in the 1950s 
“herbal researchers first came upon the traditional ‘periwinkle tea’ used by people in 
Jamaica as a folk remedy. These researchers started to study the properties of the plant
and tried to analyze its anecdotal anti-diabetic abilities—the main use for the herb in 
Jamaica,” as well as traditional medicine uses for the plant in India, Hawaii, and Central
America); Catharanthus Roseus (Madagascar Periwinkle), KEW ROYAL BOTANIC 
GARDENS, http://www.kew.org/plants-fungi/Catharanthus-roseus.htm (last visited Jan. 5,
2013) (“In traditional medicine, the Madagascar periwinkle has been used to treat a 
variety of ailments in Madagascar as well as in other parts of the world where the plant 
has naturalised.”); Anti-cancer: Rosy Periwinkle, LIVING RAINFOREST, http://www.living 
rainforest.org/about-rainforests/anti-cancer-rosy-periwinkle/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2013)
(“Traditional Madagascan healers used the rosy periwinkle for treating diabetes.”);
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vincristine sulfate derived from the plant were eventually approved by 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the 1960s for the 
treatment of Hodgkins’s disease and childhood leukemia, respectively.47 
While there may be some connection between the TK and the modern
technology in such fact patterns, the connection may be quite attentuated.
In the case of artistic elements, (mis)appropriation ranges historically
from direct, slavish copying of TCE, such as cheaper, manufactured
versions of handmade crafts, to use of TCE as an element of or 
inspiration for new, original works of expression, to the drawing of more
abstract inspiration from TCE.  Prime examples of the first category
would be direct, slavish copying of folk designs onto textiles48 and 
industrial-scale reproduction of local pottery styles.  Examples of the 
second category might be traditional Indian dances or costumes integrated
into a Bollywood production or the elements of traditional Chinese 
culture used in a film like Kung Fu Panda.49  A prime example of more
abstract inspiration would be the widely recognized and clearly visible 
influence that African art forms had on the output of Picasso.  It is
important to tease out these differences because for many, whereas the
first category may constitute “misappropriation” the third category
definitely does not.50 
Unfortunately, the international discussion of TK/TCE rarely parses 
out the issues and even more rarely focuses on the facts of even anecdotal 
47. See Desai, supra note 45.  The two FDA-approved treatments were patented. 
See U.S. Patent No. 3,025,220 (filed Oct. 26, 1961) (vincristine sulfate); U.S. Patent No. 
3,097,137 (filed May 19, 1960) (vinblastine sulfate). 
48. See, e.g., Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 240, 240 (Austl.)
(Australian aboriginal artists’ designs copied onto manufactured carpets); Kutty, supra
note 5, at 21–22 (“[C]ommunities are subjected to exploitation at the hands of large 
textile and handicrafts companies, which through modern techniques, copy and replicate 
the artistic creations . . . .”).
49. Another example might be a recording of an indigenous chant integrated into a
pop song, as happened with the German group Enigma’s use of an indigenous chant by a 
couple from the aboriginal Ami group of Taiwan.  See Angela R. Riley, Recovering
Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous Communities, 18
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 175–77 (2000), and sources used therein.
50. See, e.g., Mark Perry, Digital Propertization of the New Artifacts: The Application 
of Technologies for “Soft” Representations of the Physical and Metaphysical, 11
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 671, 705 (2003) (“There is a distinction to be drawn 
between the commercial exploitation of an artifact, such as the Maori Koru in a
trademark, and the development of an artistic appreciation of the beauty of an unfurling 
fern frond.  There is a distinction between taking a well-known traditional remedy and 
making a minimal change to claim a patent right, and the development of newly






















   
  
examples; instead, there is a tendency to simplify and make sweeping, 
often unsupported claims.51  Sometimes these are unsupported claims
about the frequency and gravity of acts of TK/TCE misappropriation.
At other times, commentators and politicians make unsupported 
claims about the value of TK/TCE.  For example, in a 2006 article, three 
U.S.-based political scientists reasoned that “[b]ecause Western economies
have become either reliant or dependent on cultural, social or biological 
resources from developing states, economic coercion [from TK/TCE
protection] becomes a real possibility.”52  Yet any sensible analysis of
Western audiovisual, music, publishing, and fashion industries—surely the
most “vulnerable” Western industries—would not find a great deal of 
“reliance” or “dependency” on non-Western TK/TCE that might be 
protected under a reasonable legal regime. 
Another problem is the tendency to conflate the use of intangible 
TK/TCE with the related but quite different history of the taking of art 
and artifacts from indigenous peoples in the Americas, Africa, Asia, and 
Oceania.53  Practically speaking, no progress will be made on the subject 
of legal protection of TK/TCE unless it is cleanly separated from 
repatriation claims related to physical objects in Western collections. 
In this discussion, I have emphasized history because such borrowing,
taking, using, adapting, being inspired by—pick your appropriation
verb—is endemic to the history of humanity.  There is no question that 
such activities were part of the Western “age of exploration” and the
centuries of colonialism that followed.54  But such borrowing is not limited 
to circumstances of conquest.  Using the broad definitions of TCE 
proposed by some demandeurs, Japanese kanji are adopted logographic 
TCE from China, Christianity started as TCE of a minor subset of the 
Jewish people, and basketball, as played globally, is Canadian-American
TCE (originating in New England from a Canadian teaching physical 
education). 
51. See, e.g., Kutty, supra note 5, at 21 (describing situation in India in general
terms and saying that “[t]he general outlook of those business interests who extensively
borrow from the collection of the folklore of the communities or tribal settlements is that 
of exploitation of material available in the public domain”). 
52. Ostergard et al., supra note 37, at 329. 
53. This conflation goes at least as far back as the 1977 Bangui Agreement, which
brought folklore and physical objects of “cultural heritage” within the same framework. 
See Bangui Agreement of March 2, 1977, supra note 5, Annex VII.
54. Ostergard et al., supra note 37, at 316 (“Since the age of exploration, researchers
and travellers have transported plant species and acquired indigenous knowledge in 
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B.  Early Developments in TK/TCE Protection and National Laws 
International discussions about the protection of folklore go back at
least to the 1967 Stockholm Diplomatic Conference for Revision of the 
Berne Convention.  In a modest attempt to adopt the copyright system to 
address folklore, a new section (4) was tacked onto article 15, providing 
as follows: 
(a) In the case of unpublished works where the identity of the author is 
unknown, but where there is every ground to presume that he is a national 
of a country of the Union, it shall be a matter for legislation in that country
to designate the competent authority who shall represent the author and
shall be entitled to protect and enforce his rights in the countries of the 
Union. 
(b) Countries of the Union which make such designation under the terms of 
this provision shall notify the Director General by means of a written 
declaration giving full information concerning the authority thus designated.
The Director General shall at once communicate this declaration to all
other countries of the Union.55 
This provision attempts to solve the apparent disconnect between 
individual authorship and the nature of folklore by allowing a member 
state to claim folkloric expressions as long as the expression can be
identified reasonably with that member state.  But one vexing issue was
completely unaddressed: that folklore—passed on from generation to 
generation—is by definition prone to be beyond any life-plus term of 
copyright protection.  And the kernel of another vexing issue became 
apparent: how to delineate the proper role of governments vis-à-vis TCE 
that should belong to indigenous people and local communities.  With 
only one country, India, ever making the designation required in section
(4)(b), Berne article 15(4) became a dead letter. 
Yet thinking about folklore protection continued in the wake of the
Stockholm revision, and in 1976, the Tunis Model Law on Copyright for 
Developing Countries was completed in a collaborative effort between
WIPO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), and the government of Tunisia.56  The Tunis
55. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 15, 
Sept. 6, 1886, as last revised, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/
en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html#P192_37445. 
56. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO] 
& WIPO, Tunis Model Law on Copyright for Developing Countries, WIPO Pub. No. 812 



















     
      
  
 




Model Law directly confronted the questions that Berne article 15(4) had 
avoided.  It grappled expressly with the issue of folklore by identifying 
works “of national folklore” as distinct from regular “literary, artistic 
and scientific works,” while giving such works of national folklore the 
same set of rights provided to other works: economic rights of reproduction,
translation, adapation, and communication to the public by performance 
or broadcast, as well as moral rights of attribution and integrity.57 
The Tunis Model Law did two other important things to set the stage 
for subsequent discussions of TCE protection.  First, it resolved the 
tension between the nature of folklore and the usual term of copyright by
providing that “[w]orks of national folklore are protected by all means 
. . . without limitation in time.”58  Second, it provided that a nation’s
folklore would be de facto owned by “competent authorit[ies]” created
and staffed by national governments.59  Commentary accompanying the
model law suggests that this is without giving the relevant ethnic
community any say in the matter.60 
On the heels of the Tunis effort, in 1977 francophone African countries 
established the Organisation Africaine de la Propriété Intellectuelle 
(OAPI) in the Bangui Agreement, a treaty that established standards for 
protection across the waterfront of intellectual property.61  The Bangui
Agreement expressly subsumes “folklore and works derived from folklore”
within the ambit of protection for copyrighted works with rights of 
57. Id. §§ 1(1)–(3), 4, 5. 
58. Id. § 6(2). 
59. Section 6(1) provides that “[i]n the case of works of national folklore, the
[economic and moral] rights . . . shall be exercised by the competent authority as defined 
in Section 18,” while section 18(iii) provides that “‘competent authority’ means one or 
more bodies, each consisting of one or more persons appointed by the Government for
the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under the provisions of this Law whenever any
matter requires to be determined by such authority.” Id. §§ 6(1), 18(iii).
60. The commentary says that the rights should be exercised “by the competent 
national authority empowered to represent the people that originated” the works of 
folklore, but does not say whether the “empower[ing]” comes from the government or 
the ethnic people. Id. cmt. 39, at 10. Immediately after this cryptic sentence the commentary
continues “[i]t has been proposed that this competent authority be the body responsible 
within the country for the administration of authors’ rights.”  Id.  This proposition 
strongly suggests that the ethnic communities were not expected to have any say in the 
matter.  Later the commentary acknowledges that although the Model Law often
mentions the ‘competent authority[,]’ [it] is by no means bound to be the same
authority in each case and it is conceivable, for instance, that the authority that
will consider applications for translation or reproduction licenses . . . will
not be the one that exercises the rights in works of national folklore under 
Section 6.
Id. cmt. 87, at 19.
61. See Bangui Agreement of March 2, 1977, supra note 5 (establishing individual 
Annexes for patent, utility models, trademarks, industrial designs, unfair competition, 
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reproduction, communication to the public, public performance, translation,
and adaptation.62  Without specifying who should own works of folklore,
the Bangui Agreement mentions neither indigenous people nor local 
communities, instead providing that any “royalties” shall be distributed 
as a “national authority” sees fit.63  Indeed, for purposes of royalties, the
1977 Bangui Agreement seems to treat older works of folklore as nothing 
more than part of a larger domain publique payant.64 
The Bangui Agreement was revised in 1999,65 but the 1999 revision
retains the same basic approach, again defining expressions of folklore 
as part of the copyright world in provisions that grant exclusive rights66 
subject to a royalty regime on a par with works that have fallen into the 
public domain.67  The 1999 version then also has a broader, TK-
encompassing concept of folklore68 subject to the state’s more general 
“protection, safeguard and promotion.”69 
On a different track, in 1973 the government of Bolivia requested that
the Director-General of UNESCO establish a program to study a possible
62. Id. Annex VII, art. 3.  This applies to folkloric works that fall in typical Berne 
categories.  The Bangui Agreement then has a Part II to Annex VII that defines folklore
much more broadly to include all TK, but then is much more ambiguous about the kind
of protection given to non-TCE folklore.  See id. Annex VII, art. 46 (definition); id. arts.
48–52 (protection). 
63. Id. art. 8(5) (“The proceeds from royalties deriving from exploitation of the
works referred to in the present Article shall be used for cultural and social purposes. 
The conditions under which such royalties are shared shall be fixed in a rule to be
promulgated by the competent national authority.”). 
64. A domain publique payant is a system in which even when works are in the 
public domain, one must pay for their use.  The parallel between older works of folklore 
and the public domain is established in article 36, which provides that
[o]n expiration of the terms of protection referred to in Articles 34 and 35,
above, during which a recognized exclusive right belongs to the authors, their 
heirs or the persons entitled, the exploitation of works of folklore or works 
falling into the public domain shall be subject to the agreement by the person
exploiting them to pay to the national authority a royalty calculated on the
basis of the gross profit of the exploitation.
Id. art. 36. 
65. See Agreement Revising the Bangui Agreement of March 2, 1977, on the 
Creation of an African Intellectual Property Organization, Feb. 24, 1999, WIPO Lex No. 
TRT/OA002/002,  http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/text.jsp?doc_id=13288 
2&file_id=181151 [hereinafter 1999 Bangui Revision]. 
66. Id. Annex VII, art. 9 (adding a right of distribution to the exclusive rights 
granted in the 1977 Bangui Agreement). 
67. Id. art. 59. 
68. Id. art. 68. 






























   
folklore protocol to the Universal Copyright Convention.70  This eventually 
led to the establishment of a joint UNESCO/WIPO working group in
1980 and the completion in 1982 of the UNESCO/WIPO Model Provisions 
for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against
Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions (Model Provisions).71 
After providing a definition of “expressions of folklore” that largely 
tracks the concept of “works” in international copyright norms,72 the
UNESCO/WIPO Model Provisions protect expressions of folklore against 
unauthorized reproduction, distribution, public performance, transmissions, 
or other communication to the public when such activities are done “both
with gainful intent and outside their traditional or customary context.”73 
Reflecting a greater awareness of the rights of indigenous peoples and 
local communities, the Model Provisions anticipate “authorization”
being granted either by a “competent authority” or the “community
concerned,”74 although there is absolutely nothing in the provisions that
acknowledge that folklore should be controlled by the indigenous people 
or local community from which it originates.75 
These international initiatives were aimed at establishing positive 
rights regimes for TCE. Meanwhile, a number of jurisdictions have 
developed defensive protection for TCEs, at least ensuring that others
cannot obtain intellectual property rights over the TCE.  Since 2002,
New Zealand’s trademark law has expressly provided for the refusal of
trademark registration where the trademark may “offend a significant 
section of the community, including Maori.”76  A year earlier, the U.S. 
70. Kutty, supra note 5, at 5. 
71. See id. at 5–6; see also UNESCO & WIPO, Model Provisions for National 
Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and Other 
Prejudicial Actions (1982) [hereinafter UNESCO/WIPO Model Provisions], available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=184668. 
72. Kutty, supra note 5, at 11 (noting that “in practical terms most of the ‘expressions
of folklore’ as per the limited definition in Section 2, are more in line with [copyright] 
‘works’”). 
73. UNESCO/WIPO Model Provisions, supra note 71, § 3 (Utilizations Subject to 
Authorization). 
74. Id. §§ 3, 6, 10. 
75. Comment 33 to the Model Provisions does offer a glimmer of recognition that
communities have interests separate from “nations” by specifying that the protection in 
the Model Provisions is focused
on artistic heritage, on the one hand, and is community oriented, on the other. . . .
[T]he artistic heritage of communities is a more restricted body of traditional 
values than the entire traditional artistic heritage of the nation.  “Traditional 
artistic heritage developed and maintained by a community” is understood as
representing a special part of the “cultural heritage of the nation.” 
Id. cmt. 33, at 15.
76. Section 17(1)(b)(ii) of the Trade Marks Act 2002 (N.Z.).  For an explication of 
the law and its background, see Susy Frankel, Third-Party Trade Marks as a Violation of 
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Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) established a database of insignia of
Native American tribes that can be used by a USPTO trademark examiner 
to reject a trademark application on the grounds that the trademark
would falsely suggest a connection with a person or group.77  A number 
of countries including India and Peru have also established different
sorts of registries intended to memorialize local TK as a means to establish 
prior art that will defeat patents over the same insights and innovations.78 
C.  The Post-TRIPS Debate 
No single event changed international intellectual property more in the 
twentieth century than the integration of intellectual property norms into
the world trading system with the TRIPS Agreement.  Integration of the 
standards of the Paris and Berne Conventions into the WTO/General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system did little to extend 
those substantive norms formally—most members of GATT were
already members of Paris, Berne, or both.  But TRIPS included a stable
of new substantive norms and a completely new set of procedural and 
enforcement obligations.  These changes along with the attachment of
the intellectual property system to the compliance mechanism of WTO 
dispute settlement meant a radical change in international intellectual
property.
Right or wrong, for better or for worse, the emergence of TRIPS also
engendered feelings among developing countries—fomented by a new 
(2005).  Of course, negative protection can become de facto positive rights.  In the case 
of New Zealand law, when a trademark encompasses a Maori element, permission of the 
appropriate Maori authority will allow the trademark registration to proceed.  Id. at 89– 
91 (describing new 2002 law and how prior practice had already sometimes required 
Maori consent for registration).
77. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), a trademark application can be rejected on the
grounds that it consists of matter that may “falsely suggest a connection with persons, 
living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols.”  15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006). 
The Native American insignia database was established in 2001.  See Establishment of a 
Database Containing the Official Insignia of Federally and State Recognized Native 
American Tribes, 60 Fed. Reg. 44,603 (Aug. 20, 2001), available at http://www.uspto.
gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2001/week39/patdata.htm. 
78. See, e.g., Law No. 27811 of 24 July 2002, Law Introducing a Protection 
Regime for the Collective Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples Derived from Biological 






   
 







   
 
 
   









    
class of activist nongovernmental organizations—that the developing
world had gotten a bad deal.79 
Opinion that TRIPS was a one-sided arrangement understandably led 
to efforts to “rebalance” the system, principally by weakening the Western
intellectual property rights in TRIPS but also by establishing new rights 
that could specifically benefit developing countries, that is, the protection of
traditional knowledge, folklore, and genetic resources.  The remark of an
Indonesian official embodies that belief: “If the knowledge assets of 
developed countries are internationally protected, why [are] the developing
countries’[] . . . not?”80  Of course, most of the “knowledge assets of 
developed countries” are not protected—centuries of art and literature 
and the vast bulk of the world’s modern technology.  But that does not 
prevent this sort of trope from being repeated over and over.81 
Not surprisingly, TRIPS also provoked reactions from the legal 
academe, most of them negative.  James Boyle was a central voice in the
scholarly zeitgeist at this time, observing that Western intellectual property 
“blinds us . . . to the importance of the raw material from which information 
products are constructed.”82  Boyle’s observations were directed at a 
spirited defense of the commons and the importance of avoiding undue 
“enclosure,”83 but his own subsequent efforts recognized the value of 
using property tools in that effort; just as the Nature Conservancy uses
79. See Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 97, 97 (“Since they had been pressured into signing
TRIPs during the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations, countries such as Brazil and 
India had argued that strong intellectual property rights helped the West but would
devastate the rest.”).  See generally  SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH 
POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST (1998). 
80. Damos Dumoli Agusman, GRTKF: The Core Concepts and Objectives, What They 
Are and Why Need Protections, Indonesia’s Perspective, at 13, WIPO/IPTK/BKK/09/ 
TOPIC1/1 (Dec. 16, 2009) (emphasis omitted), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs 
/tk/en/wipo_iptk_bkk_09/wipo_iptk_bkk_09_topic1_1.pdf. 
81. This trope is also repeated by academics who should know better. See, e.g., 
Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1331, 1353 (2004) (“[T]he intellectual products held in the developing world rest in
a global public domain, while the intellectual products of the developed world are held
closely by corporations.”); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 43, at 929 (“[W]hile the products of
formal knowledge systems have been protected as ‘property,’ those of informal, 
traditional systems have been tagged the freely available, ‘common heritage of humanity.’”)
Such statements, of course, ignore the vast wealth of public domain materials generated
by the developed world’s “formal knowledge systems.” 
82. BOYLE, supra note 43, at xiv. 
83. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the 
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property law to further environmental protection, Creative Commons
would use copyright law to further “cultural environmentalism.”84 
It is also no surprise that the focus on “raw materials” for “information
products” morphed in some people’s minds into a quest for exclusive 
control of—or at least economic rents from—the raw materials, not their
permanent, costless dedication to humanity.  As Madhavi Sunder has
pointed out, the focus by Boyle and other scholars on the public domain
itself “helped [to foster] ‘the invention of traditional knowledge’ as a 
political and legal category worthy of rights.”85  Indeed, Professor Boyle
had himself recognized the unfairness—from the perspective of distributive
justice—of a system that created rights over only the most recent
innovations.86 
In addition to what was happening in the crucibles of WIPO, WTO,
and academe, questions of cultural property have been discussed in other
multilateral venues.87  In 2001, UNESCO, which had largely gotten out
of the copyright space with the decline of the Universal Copyright 
Convention, adopted the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. 
The Declaration includes an enigmatic provision that could be taken as
support for everyone’s copyright industries as well as support for 
aggressive protection of TK/TCE: “While ensuring the free circulation
of ideas and works, cultural policies must create conditions conducive to
the production and dissemination of diversified cultural goods and services
through cultural industries that have the means to assert themselves at 
the local and global level.”88 
Recognition should also be given to the initially ad hoc and increasingly 
organized meetings of representatives of indigenous peoples.  For example,
the First International Conference on the Cultural and Intellectual 
84. James Boyle, James Boyle: Cultural Environmentalism?, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 20, 
2006, 7:01 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/cc8e24ce-a242-11da-90960000779e2340.html# 
axzz29QPjiC1K. 
85. Sunder, supra note 79, at 104. 
86. BOYLE, supra note 43, at 142 (“If one has the slightest concern for distributional
justice in one’s criteria for property regimes, this regime must surely fail.”). 
87. See, e.g., Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities Res. 1997/13, Rep. of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, 27th Sess., Aug. 4–29, 1997, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/ 
RES/1997/13 (Aug. 22, 1997), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.
nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.SUB.2.RES.1997.13.En?Opendocument.
88. Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity Annex 1, art. 9, Nov. 2, 2001, 41 












   
 













Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples was held in New Zealand in 
1993—pre-TRIPS—and attracted representatives from indigenous 
groups in fourteen mainly Pacific Rim jurisdictions, who produced the 
Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples.89  In 2007, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples that recognizes that 
“[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and
develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional 
cultural expressions.”90  The declaration further specified that “[t]hey
also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual
property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional 
cultural expressions.”91 
The increasing profile of indigenous peoples has definitely had a
salutary effect on TK/TCE discussions.  In 2010, the pan-African
intellectual property organization for anglophone countries92 established 
its own Protocol on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and
Expressions of Folklore.93 Although the Swakopmund Protocol, as it is
commonly called, still requires each country to establish a “national 
competent authority,”94 the protocol unequivocally establishes that the 
“owners of the rights shall be the holders of traditional knowledge,
namely the local and traditional communities.”95 Unlike the Model
89. First International Conference on the Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, The Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Property 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (June 1993) [hereinafter 1993 Mataatua Declaration],
available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/folklore/creative_heritage/docs/ 
mataatua.pdf.
90. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, art. 31,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/L.67 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/ 
unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf. 
91. Id. The Declaration also recognizes the rights of indigenous people to privacy
in their religious ceremonies, id. art. 12(1), to repatriation of ceremonial objects and 
human remains, id. art. 12(2), and a general “right to practise and revitalize their cultural 
traditions and customs,” which includes “the right to maintain, protect and develop” 
what we would identify as TK/TCE, id. art. 11(1).
92. This organization is known as the African Regional Intellectual Property 
Organization (ARIPO).  But ARIPO does not include Nigeria and South Africa, the two 
largest anglophone economies on the continent.  See AFR. REGIONAL INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.aripo.org/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). 
93. See Swakopmund Protocol on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and
Expressions of Folklore, Aug. 9, 2010, WIPO Lex No. TRT/AP010/001,  http://www. 
wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/text.jsp?doc_id=1 50520&file_id=201022 [hereinafter
Swakopmund Protocol].
94. Id. § 3. 
95. Id. § 6 (“The owners of the rights shall be the holders of traditional knowledge, 
namely the local and traditional communities, and recognized individuals within such
communities, who create, preserve and transmit knowledge in a traditional and
intergenerational context in accordance with the provisions of section 4.”).  Section 7.1 
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Provisions from the 1980s, the 2010 Swakopmund Protocol envisions 
protecting TCE against “uses of expressions of folklore taking place
outside their traditional or customary context, whether or not for commercial
gain.”96 
Back at WIPO, in 2010 the IGC began looking for a way to produce 
more substantive progress in the discussions: the IGC agreed first to a
series of “intersessional” experts’ meetings in 2011 and then to itself 
holding three sessions, instead of two, each one dedicated to one of the
three topics—GR, TK, and TCE.97  From these many meetings, it became
clear that true progress would depend on reaching acceptable
compromises in four areas: (1) the protected subject matter, that is, the
subject of protection; (2) the scope of protection, that is, exclusive rights, 
protection against misappropriation, et cetera; (3) the definition of the 
beneficiaries of protection; and (4) the limitations and exceptions.  The 
resolution of these issues can affect whether any justifications of
intellectual property may be workable in the TK/TCE context. 
One of the key questions embedded in the criteria for protected
TK/TCE is how does one determine what TK/TCE belongs to whom.  
The problem of “who would own what” simply threatens to overwhelm 
any system unless it is dealt with at the fundamental level.98  Generally 
speaking, demandeurs have failed to treat this problem seriously, even 
though, as some political scientists noted, the “underlying problem in
dealing with indigenous intellectual property is that there is often no
clear lineage of ownership to the idea or resource.”99 
This would be a challenge even with a static form of TK/TCE, for 
example, a distinct decorative pattern used unchanged through the 
generations.  But TK/TCE is celebrated as evolving and changing, in 
contrast to Western notions of static intellectual property, and that
section 6 the exclusive right to authorize the exploitation of their traditional knowledge.” 
Id. § 7.1.  Section 18 similarly provides that “[t]he owners of the rights in expressions of 
folklore shall be the local and traditional communities . . . who maintain and use the 
expressions of folklore as a characteristic of their traditional cultural heritage.” Id. § 18. 
96. Id. § 20.1(b) (emphasis added). 
97. The Author was the designated expert for the United States in the 2011 
intersessionals for TCE and TK.
98. As some political scientists noted in 2006, “[t]he conflict . . . originates when
bioprospectors utilise local knowledge to ‘discover’ those new products.  Whether the 
product is derived from a plant or animal, or is based in the genetic characteristics of a 
local population, the complexity associated with ownership of the knowledge or product
immediately appears.”  Ostergard et al., supra note 37, at 324. 
99. Id. at 325. 
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exacerbates the problem of identifying who “holds” what. Distinct
music genres, crafts, architectural styles, and languages themselves are 
developed from prior genres, crafts, styles, and languages.  For example, 
“highlife” music is identified as TCE originating in Ghana and, from 
there, spreading through west Africa.100  But highlife was itself developed 
from elements originating in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Jamaica, and the
United States, not to mention musical instruments developed in Europe.101 
IV. CAN WE JUSTIFY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN TK/TCE? 
Munzer and Raustiala conclude that protection of TK/TCE “fits poorly
within standard justifications of property” and that “the chief arguments 
employed in the moral, political, and legal philosophies of property do 
not justify a robust package of rights” for holders of TK/TCE.102  This  
conclusion seems generally correct, but I would have significant carve-
outs for accounts of intellectual property based on privacy, incentives for
preservation, and above all, fairness and distributive justice. 
Indeed, privacy, preservation, and distributive justice have not been
chief arguments for intellectual property in the past, and if we are going
to find a credible account of the protection of TK/TCE, we must focus 
on these.  But it is also worthwhile to consider some of the complexities 
of applying even these chief arguments to TK/TCE. 
A.  Incentive Theories and TK/TCE 
In any discussion of incentives—particularly incentives to create—we 
should remember that some advocates for TK/TCE protection assume, 
and emphasize, the non-Western, “other” nature of indigenous peoples, 
 100. BOATEMA BOATENG, THE COPYRIGHT THING DOESN’T WORK HERE: ADINKRA 
AND KENTE CLOTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN GHANA 93 (2011). 
101. Id. (“According to music scholar and activist John Collins, some of the earliest 
roots of highlife can be traced to influences from Sierra Leone, Liberia, and even Jamaica.
From Sierra Leone came the gombey drums and drumming, one of many forms of
African music that were ‘taken to the Americas by slaves, transmuted there, and then 
brought back to Africa.’  In this case, the return occurred through freed Maroon slaves 
from Jamaica, who settled in Sierra Leone in the early nineteenth century.  From Liberia 
came ‘an African guitar plucking technique’ developed by sailors from the Kru ethnic 
group. . . . The earliest forms of highlife emerged in the Gold Coast in the late nineteenth
century when musicians added the instruments introduced by European military bands at
forts along the coast.” (quoting John Collins, The Early History of West African Highlife
Music, 8 POPULAR MUSIC 221, 221 (1989); John Collins, The ‘Folkloric Copyright Tax’ 
Problem in Ghana, WACC GLOBAL, http://waccglobal.org/en/20031-intellectual-property-
rights-and-communication/649-The-folkloric-copyright-tax-problem-in-Ghana.html (last
visited Jan. 5, 2013))). 
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if not local communities.103  Reasoning that these same indigenous peoples
are, or should be, susceptible to economic incentives may be incongruent 
with basic assumptions of the discussion—at least for those advocates.
1. Incentives To Create or Innovate 
If TK/TCE is understood as a sort of treasure trove pertaining to each
local culture, a straightforward, Nordhausian incentive theory for the 
stimulation of TK/TCE production does not make sense.104  Munzer and 
Raustiala encapsulate this thought in their conclusion that TK/TCE 
protection “cannot be defended on the basis of an incentive to innovate. 
The innovation has already occurred.”105 
But this assumes the TK/TCE is fixed and static, that is, an extant 
corpus, and that assumption is something that TK/TCE demandeurs
vigorously resist.  For example, in the April 2012 meeting of the IGC, South
Africa insisted that the definition of TK recognize that it is “knowledge 
that is dynamic and evolving.”106  The fact that TK/TCE intellectual 
property advocates argue that whatever protection is crafted should
apply to new and subsequent TK/TCE could be taken as evidence that 
TK/TCE protection is envisaged as a stimulus for further development of 
the traditional culture.  But this insistence happens in the negotiations for 
103. See generally DEBORAH ROOT, CANNIBAL CULTURE: ART, APPROPRIATION, AND 
THE COMMODIFICATION OF DIFFERENCE (1995); MELFORD E. SPIRO, ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
OTHER OR BURMESE BROTHER?: STUDIES IN CULTURAL ANALYSIS, at x (1992) (describing 
how “contemporary anthropology holds that, for Western social scientists, non-Western 
actors are the ‘Other’”).
104. Some stars in the constellation of incentive-to-create literature are William D. 
Nordhaus, Richard Gilbert, Carl Shapiro, and S.J. Liebowitz.  See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS,
INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE (1969); Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 
21 RAND J. ECON. 106 (1990); S.J. Liebowitz, Copying and Indirect Appropriability:
Photocopying of Journals, 93 J. POL. ECON. 945 (1985). 
105. Munzer & Raustiala, supra note 4, at 73; see also Hansen, supra note 4, at 761 
(after discussing incentive-to-create justifications, “TK protections do not have such 
elegant theoretical backing”).
 106. WIPO, Matters Concerning the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC), Annex B,
at 10, WIPO Doc. WO/GA/41/15 (Aug. 1, 2012) [hereinafter WIPO, Intergovernmental 
Committee]; see also 1993 Mataatua Declaration, supra note 89, § 2.2 (“Recognise that 
indigenous people also have the right to create new knowledge based on cultural 
traditions.”); WIPO, supra note 7, at 6 (“TK is being created every day, and evolves as 
individuals and communities respond to the challenges posed by their social environment.”); 































other reasons—the same reasons the word folklore fell out of favor; 
expressly recognizing the prospect of new TK/TCE speaks to the 
vibrancy of traditional cultural and asserts that traditional culture is not 
just a defeated, historical “other” but a continuing alternative to modern,
Western life.
Even if TK/TCE protection is envisaged as extending to a developing,
evolving corpus, it seems hard to disagree with Munzer and Raustiala’s
conclusion that there already appear to be adequate incentives to create
for TK/TCE.  Indeed, ample, robust production of TK/TCE is a central 
part of the demandeurs’ understanding of TK/TCE.  Sometimes a parallel 
argument is used against copyright, or the current breadth of copyright,
that is, that no copyright incentive is needed for the production of term 
papers, scholarly writing, television commercials, posters promoting feature
films, and some elements of the music business that can be sustained on 
paid performances.  I am generally hesitant to embrace such arguments 
in relation to an existing form of intellectual property on the grounds that 
they call for an unworkable granularity in policymaking—unworkable 
because business practices change more quickly than legislation and 
because citizens, both as producers and consumers of works, can only
digest so much granularity when it comes to the law working as an
incentive structure.107 
But the no-incentive-is-needed argument has a different status when
one is considering the establishment of a category of intellectual property 
that does not yet exist, whether it is sui generis protection of nonoriginal 
databases, protection for semiconductor masks, or protection of TK/TCE.
As long as the unprotected subject matter is sufficiently delineated such
that we can presently judge citizen behavior in creating and using the 
material, then it is reasonable to assume that if there is already adequate
production, no further incentive is needed.108 
Even if incentives to create were needed for the kinds of materials we 
call TK and TCE, the incentives from TK/TCE protection would be
quite attenuated, for both doctrinal and practical reasons.  Doctrinally, 
107. Proposing more granular categories of protection and nonprotection for expressive
works is quite different than proposing a return to a registration system.  A registration
system with adequate marking of registered works provides both producers and consumers 
with a relatively simple bright-line rule.
108. This could also be taken as a question of where the burden of proof falls when
advocating any change in the law. See Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, 
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground?, 70 MINN. 
L. REV. 417, 439–40 (1985–1986) (“[T]he consideration of intellectual property issues 
should be governed by standards and procedures that are understood in advance and
applied uniformly from case to case.  At the outset, the proponents of change should
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the entire TK/TCE discussion is premised on the idea that expression
and knowledge must pass through at least one generation before becoming 
traditional.109  Just as there is strong evidence that the furthest reaches of 
the life-plus-seventy-years copyright term provide little or no incentive 
to create for rational actors,110 a similar problem would arise with any 
incentive to create from TK/TCE protection: strictly applied, the
“intergenerational” requirement means that any benefits would not arise 
for roughly twenty to twenty-five years.111  And copyright or patent
protection would apply immediately to the new expressive works or to 
some of the innovations, respectively.
109. See, e.g., UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage art. 2(1), Oct. 17, 2003, 2368 U.N.T.S. 3 (defining “intangible cultural heritage” as
“transmitted from generation to generation” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bangui
Agreement of March 2, 1977, supra note 5, Annex VII, art. 8(2) (defining folklore as
“literary, artistic or scientific works . . . which are passed from generation to generation”);
Swakopmund Protocol, supra note 93, pmbl., at 6 (“[T]he specific characteristics of 
traditional knowledge and expressions of folklore[] includ[e] their collective or
community context, [and] the intergenerational nature of their development . . . .”); WIPO, 
Intergovernmental Committee, supra note 106, Annex B, at 10 (proposing that the 
definition of TK require it to be knowledge “that is intergenerational” or “that is passed 
on from generation to generation”); Martin A. Girsberger, Legal Protection of Traditional
Cultural Expressions: A Policy Perspective, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL
CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 123, 127 (Christoph Beat Graber & 
Mira Burri-Nenova eds., 2008) (describing TCE as “handed down from one generation 
to the next”).
110. A group of economists concluded that the twenty years of protection added to 
the U.S. copyright term in 1998 increases the present value of a copyrighted work’s 
market over time by less than one percent. See Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2002)
(No. 01-618), available at http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/
amici/economists.pdf (concluding that the longer term’s “present value is small, very
likely an improvement of less than 1% compared to the pre-[1998] term”); see also
Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900– 
2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2236–37 (2000) (noting that from an incentive perspective 
the 1998 extension “is virtually worthless” because “from a present-value perspective, 
the additional incentive to create a copyrightable work is negligible for an extension of
copyright from life-plus-fifty years to life-plus-seventy years”). 
111. Discounting for the present value of future dollars, this was Zechariah
Chafee’s conclusion in relation to the renewal copyright term, starting at the twenty-
eight year mark: when the copyright term consisted of an initial twenty-eight-year term
and a twenty-eight-year renewal, the market value of the renewal term, measured at the 
beginning of the first term, was near zero.  See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the


















     
 
    




   
 
   
2. Incentives for Development and Commercialization 
Moving beyond incentives to create, there is also widespread 
acknowledgment that intellectual property rights can provide incentives 
to develop and commercialize innovations and creative expressions.
This reasoning is associated with Edmund Kitch’s justification for patent 
rights.  Kitch reasoned that giving the inventor a set of exclusive 
entitlements to the initial invention would permit the inventor to coordinate
refinement and commercialization of the invention.112  This general
observation has been extended by a number of commentators.113 The 
same argument applies nicely to novels and screenplays—the exclusive 
rights of copyright create the potential for payoff that propels the author 
and then the book agent, producer, and publisher to promote the work 
and development of derivative works thereof. 
At the same time, there is responsive literature that says that patent 
owners are often not the best positioned to develop their innovations, 
either in commercialization or follow-on inventions.114  Indeed, Kitch 
himself recognized this point.115  And a sensible reading of the TK/TCE
discourse would probably lead to the conclusion that indigenous people 
and local communities are not well-placed to take an active role in 
licensing protected TK or TCE.  Part of the core narrative of the GRTKF
debates is how it is the Western entrepreneurs or capital elites—the 
prospectors, so to speak—who identify the value of TK and TCE in
relation to extant culture and technology.
112. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 265 (1977). 
113. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for 
Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 340–45 (2008); F. Scott Kieff,
Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 
697 passim (2001); Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of
Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503 passim (2009). 
114. See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 
519, 524 (1945); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual
Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1048–58 (1997); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the
Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 739–43 (2012); Robert P. Merges & Richard R.
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 871–75 
(1990); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the 
Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 126.  Ted Sichelman reasons that although “there 
is no reason to expect that inventors who win the race to patent will be the best 
commercializers,” patents may be an appropriate mechanism to protect innovators. Ted 
Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 367 (2010). 
115. Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis 
of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1740 (2000) (“[Patent] rights can easily
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3. Incentives for Preservation and Conservation 
Finally, among the different incentive arguments, we must consider
incentives to preserve.  Preservation of TK/TCE figures prominently in 
narratives about TK/TCE protection, although it is not frequently expressed
as a matter of incentives, let alone financial incentives.116 
It is sometimes pointed out that whatever the merits of exclusive rights
over GRTKF, this is not a suitable realm for intellectual property rights
because intellectual property is about incentives for creation.  This is an
important point, but one that cannot be taken very far.  If preservation of 
assets is a justification for property rights over GRTKF, this is not 
qualitatively different from justifications that are given for the protection
of trademarks and geographical indications.  In the late 1990s, copyright 
owners argued that preservation of assets justified the extension of the 
copyright term in the United States from life-plus-fifty to life-plus-seventy 
years.117  Films and old television programs were the prime example
here, although the same rationale could apply to sound recordings and
photographs.
The idea that exclusive rights to TK/TCE could create an environment 
for better conservation and preservation of TK/TCE has a powerful initial 
appeal.  Indeed, preservation of resources is one of the few justifications 
that John Rawls expressly embraces for property rights.  In The Law of
Peoples, Rawls offers the following reasoning:
[A]n important role of government . . . is to be the effective agent of a people
as they take responsibility for their territory and the size of their population, as 
well as for maintaining the land’s environmental integrity.  Unless a definite
agent is given responsibility for maintaining an asset and bears the responsibility
and loss for not doing so, that asset tends to deteriorate.  On my account the
role of the institution of property is to prevent this deterioration from occurring.118 
116. See Hansen, supra note 4, at 775. 
117. See H.R. REP. No. 105-452, at 4 (1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/CRPT-105hrpt452/pdf/CRPT-105hrpt452.pdf (noting that twenty year extension 
would “provide copyright owners generally with the incentive to restore older works and 
further disseminate them to the public”).  The Supreme Court recognized this as an 
acceptable policy rationale for the life-plus-seventy term.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 207 (2003) (“[Congress] rationally credited projections that longer terms would 
encourage copyright holders to invest in the restoration and public distribution of their
works.”). 
 118. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 8 (1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, THE LAW OF 
PEOPLES].  In A Theory of Justice, Rawls expresses a similar concern without connecting 



















    
 
      
 
Later in the same book, he provides this elaboration: 
As I see it the point of the institution of property is that, unless a definite agent 
is given responsibility for maintaining an asset and bears the loss for not doing
so, that asset tends to deteriorate.  In this case the asset is the people’s territory
and its capacity to support them in perpetuity; and the agent is the people 
themselves as politically organized.119 
This explication of property draws the concept close to that of a national 
territory.  National territory becomes the people’s property, and for 
Rawls, the order among just peoples means that they are not getting any 
more property, absent an extraordinary act of territorial bequest—the
sort of thing that happened in monarchical Europe and colonial empires, 
but seems unlikely among just peoples.  Because the people are not
getting any more territorial property, they must learn to preserve what
they have.
Of course, we know that there are other mechanisms to make people 
care for physical assets.  Each year, thousands of us write checks to the 
Central Park Conservancy, a private group that raises and spends nearly
forty million dollars a year to take care of an impressive piece of real
estate that neither it nor any of us contributors own.120  And yet there is 
no question that property rights do give owners incentives to conserve 
real estate and chattel goods.  In the Soviet Union, when large apartment 
buildings fell into disrepair it was commonly said, “No one owns it, so 
no one takes care of it.”  If you are the host of the party, you care a lot
more when people start dancing on the furniture.
Despite its initial appeal, the problem with the incentives-to-preserve 
argument for exclusive rights is that the exclusive rights do not by 
themselves trigger preservation or conservation.  The world of audiovisual 
preservation offers one rough analog—a vast amount of cultural material
in need of stewardship—and is exemplary with its complex topography. 
Copyright owners are substantially engaged in restoration and preservation, 
and those so engaged demonstrate clear ownership motivations.  Although 
there is no doubt that film studios and other private owners of old 
films—film stock and copyright—undertake some of their conservation 
efforts from an alloy of civic duty and institutional pride, profit from 
[hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE] (“In both a private-property as well as in a
socialist society great concern may be expressed for preventing irreversible damages and 
for husbanding natural resources and preserving the environment.”). 
 119. RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra  note 118, at 39 (emphasis omitted). 
120. Formed in 1980, the Central Park Conservancy is a private, nonprofit organization.
The Conservancy “provides 85 percent of Central Park’s $45.8 million annual Parkwide 
expense budget through its fundraising and investment revenue” to manage the park 
under contract from the City of New York. About the Central Park Conservancy, CENT. 




























    
[VOL. 49:  1215, 2012] TK/TCE and Siren’s Call of Property 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
their vast libraries is usually part of the equation.  As one industry observer
puts it, the choice of films for restoration “typically comes down to
moneymaking potential.”121 
On the other side of the equation, nonprofits and governments are 
engaged in at least equally ambitious efforts.  Founded in 1997, the 
Library of Congress’s National Film Preservation Foundation had, as of
2010, helped restore approximately 1,650 films.122  Other significant efforts
at film preservation and restoration can be found with New York’s
Museum of Modern Art (MoMA),123 UCLA, the Eastman House in 
Rochester, the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, and many
smaller foundations and institutes. 
It would be hard to overemphasize how much film preservation is
nonmarket, depending on governments, nonprofits, and charities.  In 
2010, the British Film Institute (BFI) launched a campaign to raise one 
million pounds to restore nine of Alfred Hitchcock’s early works124— 
apparently because Hitchcock’s marquee name is not enough to give 
these silent films enough commercial rerelease value to trigger their 
restoration.  In the United States, in the words of one journalist, “Hollywood
essentially relies on the Library of Congress to handle most of its 
preservation efforts.”125 
In this sense, the most blunt version of the incentive-to-preserve
argument would not hold for audiovisual works—and if Hitchcock is not 
enough to identify marketable property in the audiovisual world, it is not
clear how we would identify TK/TCE both in need of preservation and 
marketable as property.  On the other hand, exclusive control of the 
 121. Marc Graser, Hollywood or Dust!, VARIETY, Aug. 2–8, 2010, at 1, 28. 
122. Id. at 1.  The building of the Library of Congress’s Packard Campus of the
National Audio-Visual Conservation Center in 2007 was made possible by a $160 
million grant from the Packard Humanities Institute.  Id.  The Center is one of the few in
the world that works with nitrate negatives (film stock from the early 1890s to 1951); 
Hollywood studios have entrusted the Library’s Packard Campus with Frank Capra
films, the camera negative of The Maltese Falcon, and Stan Laurel films. Id.
123. Since 1996, MoMA has had a large remote center in Hamlin, Pennsylvania to
preserve and do conservation work on its collection of 27,000-plus films—a center for
which MoMA seeks donations.  Email from MoMA to Justin Hughes (April 18, 2012, 
1:06 PM) (on file with author) (seeking contributions to Annual Fund on the basis of
film preservation work).
124. Hitchcock ‘Adoption’ in UK, CHINA DAILY (July 8, 2010), http://wo.chinadaily. 
com.cn/view.php?mid=16794&cid=98&isid=162. 


























   
 
 
restored prints is part of the BFI’s overall economic plan for restoration
of the Hitchcock films. 
More importantly, the analogy to film may give us too narrow a sense 
of preservation when it comes to TK and TCE.  Preservation of TK and
TCE involves preservation of practices, activities, and skills.  It is not 
just preservation of pottery forms in extant works, but how to make the 
pottery.  If granting exclusive rights to typical art and craft designs,
forms, and styles would curb industrial production of the same and 
enhance the capacity of local communities to maintain local production, 
surely this would be a form of preservation.126  In a similar fashion, 
exclusive rights could give some incentive, in some circumstances, for
TK/TCE preservation.
B.  Labor Theories and TK/TCE 
Locke’s account of property rights focuses on the individual human— 
not an auspicious fact for an account of collective and community rights. 
Because the individual laborer, artist, inventor, or tinkerer seems to
remain central to most accounts of intellectual property, as Robert Merges
notes, “collective creativity is today seen as a challenge to conventional 
mechanisms of encouragement, protection, and recognition.  Intellectual 
property in particular is said to be a poor fit with this new form of
creative work.”127  This sort of observation has been made frequently in
relation to collaborative and collective processes on the Internet.128 
But the same concern is raised in relation to TK/TCE.  As one carefully
worded WIPO publication puts it, “Is the IP system compatible with the 
values and interests of traditional communities—or does it privilege 
individual rights over the collective interests of the community?”129 
Boatema Boateng has raised the same genre of concern in relation to 
126. Madhavi Sunder has made the same argument in relation to protection of 
geographical indications (GIs).  Sunder, supra note 79, at 99 (“One hope is that Geographical 
Indication (GI) protection will allow local artisans to stay in their communities and fend 
for themselves, without having to renounce their traditional work for life in the 
overcrowded cities.”).  I have doubts about how much GI protection can do this, but 
believe a similar, stronger case can be built for the potential impact of exclusive rights on 
TCE art forms. 
 127. Merges, Locke for the Masses, supra note 21, at 1181. 
128. Two discussions from the earliest days of the Internet are Margaret Chon, New
Wine Bursting from Old Bottles: Collaborative Internet Art, Joint Works, and
Entrepreneurship, 75 OR. L. REV. 257 (1996), and Ira V. Heffen, Copyleft: Licensing 
Collaborative Works in the Digital Age, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1487 (1997).  See also Yochai 
Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a
Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273 (2004). 
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some west African TCE: adinkra and kente cloth.130  Boateng views
Western intellectual property as focused on the individual and only 
providing recognition of groups through a fiction: 
Only individuals can claim to be authors or inventors; thus, cultural producers 
who work as individuals have legal standing, while those who operate in 
groups do not unless they individually claim authorship of discrete parts of the 
group’s production.  Alternatively, if those groups are formally constituted
such that they can claim the status of “legal persons,” then the group becomes 
a kind of honorary individual that can claim authorship.131 
It seems true that intellectual labor by “large groups of dispersed
creators” is “not well-accounted for in our legal system,”132 but I share
Merges’s belief that collective creativity is not as incompatible with
classic accounts of intellectual property, including labor theory accounts, 
as many commentators have claimed.133 
To see this more clearly, consider Boateng’s comparison of the context of
the production of adinkra and kente cloth versus her view of Western
art: 
[I]n the case of adinkra and kente . . . authorization comes not from the person 
who makes the cloth but from the history that makes the cloth a valuable 
commodity.  The cloth maker’s name, in this scheme, has little authorizing 
value.  Rather, it is his ability to link his cloth to a particular heritage whose 
elements include a long tradition of practice on the part of other cloth producers 
in his spatial and temporal community. . . .
. . . .
. . . Unlike Foucault’s “author function” that invests discourses with authority, 
authorization here is not bound up with the identity of a single person working 
at a specific historical moment but with a community of living and deceased
producers. Authorship and authorization, in this scheme, are therefore
collaborative and temporally indefinite.134 
Initially this description seems compelling, but does it really identify 
anything different from some Western artistic practices?  Instead of cloth, 
substitute visual characters, and instead of kente and adinkra, use Mickey
Mouse, Tin-Tin, Batman, Dr. Who, or any number of cultural franchises 
in the West.  For each of these franchises, “authorization . . . is not bound up
with the identity of a single person working at a specific historical
moment but with a community of living and deceased producers” and the
130. See BOATENG, supra note 100, at 2–3. 
131. Id. at 109. 
 132. Merges, Locke for the Masses, supra note 21, at 1180. 
133. See id. at 1180–82. 












     
  











   
 
visual artist’s name, in these schemes, “has little authorizing value” because 
the overarching objective is to “link” the new work to a “particular heritage”
of known elements.135 
Large, collaborative groups in which individual identity was often
submerged and even more frequently lost are part and parcel of Western
creativity—this is true not just with pop culture entertainment but also 
with the paintings in our museums that are designated only “School of 
________” and how we revere relatively anonymous design in crafts and 
useful items as in the Victoria & Albert Museum collection of pottery or 
MoMA’s collection of twentieth-century electric appliances.
Both Boateng and Merges might say that I am cheating a bit because
even where Western culture submerges individual identity—a Disney
film, “designed by Apple,” Rookwood pottery, “School of Caravaggio”— 
there is still a “single highly centralized creative entity” and that
centralization permits our accounts of intellectual property to work.136 
Merges’s intuition is that even beyond such centralized creative enterprises,
it should be possible “to make out a fuzzy case for a group right on the 
basis of a generalized appreciation for collective labor”137 and that 
“[s]omething like exclusive (or semi-exclusive) rights to be held by groups
who exert collective labor on things would satisfy the basic requirement 
of rewarding Lockean labor.”138  Beyond those intuitions, he seems
conflicted as to how to make a labor theory account of intellectual 
property workable with relatively decentralized collective labor.139 
The caution is well-placed, but I think that the degree of centralization 
is not the dispositive issue.  Locke’s narrative is one of the individual’s
actions and prerogatives in relation to the rest of humanity: “[m]ankind 
in common,” “[m]en in [c]ommon,” “all [m]en,” “all his [f]ellow-
[c]ommoners, all [m]ankind.”140  For all the moves Locke makes, it is a 
135. Id.  Boateng also distinguishes the adinkra and kente production this way:
“Although the designs [that adinkra and kente makers] use have individual creators, 
those individuals are not easily separated from the community as authors because the
norm is for their designs to pass into the communal pool.”  Id. at 109.  But, again, this 
would be true of the individual contributions of creators working in a large studio, 
whether the animators at Disney or the potters at Rookwood. 
 136. Merges, Locke for the Masses, supra note 21, at 1180. 
137. Id. at 1188. 
138. Id. at 1191.  Merges’s thesis is that “from a Lockean perspective . . . collective 
labor ought to count just as much, at least in some situations, as a foundation for property
claims.”  Id. at 1185. 
139. He thinks this can be done “without unduly complicating the IP system,” id. at 
1191, but has misgivings about how “to figure out even a moderately workable structure 
for such a right,” id. at 1188. 
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story of an individual in one tribe without any other tribes being present.141 
Contrast this with Rawls, who eschews any commitment to private
property when he is focused on the individual within the tribe, but more 
expressly embraces property as a concept when concerned with interaction 
among peoples.142  The question is not whether to centralize or
decentralize but whether the group laboring collaboratively has a distinct 
identity from the rest of “[m]ankind in common” such that the group can
carry out the use and enjoyment that Locke requires and therefore warrant
property rights.143 
Assuming that we accept that the relatively decentralized group laboring 
collaboratively can fit within a labor-desert theory, our initial acceptance 
would almost certainly be for relatively contemporaneous collaborative 
labor—something like Wikipedia.  The intergenerational premise of 
TK/TCE means that we will also have to resolve a question the labor
theory does not usually confront: who is the laborer across time? This is
where one of the key issues under negotiation makes its presence felt:
the beneficiary group—who is the continuing indigenous people?  What 
constitutes the “same” local community analogous to being the same 
person over the decades? 
One could think of this as a problem of representation, a problem of
identity, or both.  To be more specific, the relationship of the present
generation to the future might be one of representation,144 but the
relationship of the present generation to the past strikes me as a question 
whether the present individuals are the same people. Locke clearly saw
the labor theory as resting on the present person’s labor—as in the 
philosopher’s observation that God gave the Earth to “the Industrious 
141. True, he writes of “several [n]ations of the Americans,” id. § 41, at 338 
(emphasis omitted), and that “in the beginning all the [w]orld was America,” id. § 49, at 
343 (emphasis omitted), but I read him to view the Native Americans as a case study of
what happens when there is a lack of labor.
 142. While Rawls’s discussion “assume[s] that the regime is a property-owning 
democracy since this case is likely to be better known” as between a private property
system, a socialist system of production, or some hybrid, he tells us that “[t]he theory of
justice does not include these matters.” RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 118, at 
242. 
 143. LOCKE, supra note 20, § 25, at 327. 
144. See Merges, Locke for the Masses, supra note 21, at 1190 (“The problem of 
representation arises here, and might serve as a model.  In these cases, the current 
inhabitants of traditional leadership roles are assumed to adequately represent the



























and Rational, . . . not to the Fancy or Covetousness or the Quarrelsom
and Contentious.”145 
Perhaps there is some combination of Lockean labor theory and 
Rawlsian justice across generations available to us.  It is easy to imagine
a necessary, but not sufficient, condition that the indigenous people or 
local community must be themselves laboring on the TK/TCE in order 
to inherit the mantle of sameness.  This might give resonance to the 
TK/TCE demandeurs’ insistence that TK/TCE is dynamic and evolving—
one might say, yes, it must be dynamic and evolving.
Even if not an obligatory evolving condition, applying Locke to
TK/TCE could bring conditions of use and nonspoliation into the 
equation: where TK/TCE “perished” under the control of the indigenous 
people or local community without its “due use,” this would be offensive 
to the rest of humanity’s enjoyment of the resources in question.146 
A straightforward example might be where an indigenous people or local 
community kept control of some physical cultural asset and permitted
that asset to deteriorate beyond restoration.  Another might be an indigenous
language’s slow decline to extinction. Either case might be particularly 
troubling if outsiders had offered to maintain the TCE but were refused
on the grounds of the indigenous people or local community’s exclusive
control.  Use or nonspoliation condition(s) could put a labor-desert
analysis of TK/TCE protection in virtual juxtapose with an incentive-to-
preserve analysis: the former saying that efforts to preserve are required 
to justify the protection and the latter saying that the protection is needed
to motivate the efforts to preserve.
But aside from physical deterioration of cultural assets, and maybe 
language death, it may not be easy to map Locke’s notion of impermissible
spoilage onto TK/TCE.  In section 38, Locke writes of “Grass of his 
Inclosure [that] rotted on the Ground, or the Fruit of his planting [that] 
perished without gathering.”147  This is both waste of the individual’s
labor—planting the fruit—and waste of valuable assets that others could
enjoy—the fruit.148  Propertization is fine “so long as nothing perishe[s]
uselessly in his hands,” and as to shells, gold, and jewels acquired through 
barter of the perishable, that “he might heap up as much of these durable 
things as he please[s]; the exceeding of the bounds of his just [p]roperty
 145. LOCKE, supra note 20, § 34, at 333. 
146. The phrases are drawn from LOCKE, supra note 20, § 37, at 337, in which 
Locke is describing acquisition of property before the appropriation of land. 
 147. LOCKE, supra note 20, § 38, at 337. 
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not lying in the largeness of his [p]ossession, but the perishing of anything
uselessly in it.”149 
Locke’s discussion of spoilage is not clearly premised or conditioned 
on others needing that which went to waste.  And his example, not
surprisingly, is what we would now call renewable resources.  Taken
together, that would mean some of the objectionable waste is, in a sense,
“victimless.”  Along this pathway, the spoilage condition could become
a simple use condition—perhaps Tully’s reading.  Of course, intellectual
property has a complex history with use conditions: whether the
manufacturing requirement that existed in U.S. copyright law,150 the
“working requirement” that exists in the patent system,151 or various
regimen of compulsory licensing, both real and proposed.152  It is an  
intriguing question how one would formulate a working requirement for 
publicly known TK/TCE, that is, TK/TCE that is not kept secret.
C.  Personality Justifications and TK/TCE 
Personality justifications for intellectual property might transmute 
themselves most helpfully by being understood as justifications for 
protection of TK/TCE based on the increased autonomy and recognition 
that would be afforded to the indigenous people, local community, and
 149. LOCKE, supra note 20, § 46, at 342 (emphasis omitted).
150. The domestic manufacturing clause first appeared in the 1909 version of the 
Copyright Act.  Under the terms of the Act of July 13, 1982, the domestic manufacturing 
clause expired on June 30, 1986.  Act of July 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-215, 96 Stat. 178
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 601 (repealed 2010)). 
151. Article 5(A)(4) of the Paris Convention recognizes that countries may impose 
working requirements by constraining compulsory licensing that may result from the 
failure to work the patent.  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 
5(A)(4), Mar. 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 107 (“A compulsory license may not be applied 
for on the ground of failure to work or insufficient working before the expiration of a 
period of four years from the date of filing of the patent application or three years from 
the date of the grant of the patent, whichever period expires last; it shall be refused if the 
patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons.”).  The working requirement existed 
in U.S. patent law until 1908. 
152. For example, TRIPS article 31 provides for “use of the subject matter of a 
patent without the authorization of the right holder” but only if, absent a national 
emergency, “prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization
from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such 
efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time.”  Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 















   
 
 




   







       
 
 
   
nation-state that houses them.153  The problem in applying a personality
justification directly to TK/TCE rights held by a group would be the 
recognition of the group, whether indigenous tribe or local community, 
as having its own “group personality.”  That, of course, is part of the 
larger challenge of how the group as a receptacle or holder of rights fits 
in a modern system that focuses on the individual as the seat of rights,
prerogatives, and responsibilities.154 
But as Peggy Radin has observed, even if “we lack a convincing theory
of group rights . . . group cohesion may be important and even necessary
to [individual] personhood.”155  Discussing the Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas case, in which six students sharing a house challenged zoning 
regulations that limited the village to nuclear families, Radin sees the 
case as one “involving personhood, in the guise of freedom of association, 
on both sides.”156  In other words, both sides had claims that the personhood 
of their individual members would be harmed if they were not permitted
to exercise their own freedom of association—one being the six students
living with each other and the other being the 700 nuclear families 
associated together as a village.  Radin’s own examples come from real
property situations, but I do not see any reason that the same kind of 
analysis cannot be applied to elements of culture or know-how.
As long as the maintenance of group identity is part of the personhood
interests of each individual member of the group, we do not need a 
theory of group rights to have personality interests count as a justification of
some kind of protection of TK/TCE.  Indeed, when American law 
protects Native Americans by limiting the alienability of any “object 
having ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural importance central to 
[a] Native American group or culture,”157 there is no crisis in justification 
for the law.  Everyone understands that, regardless of one’s views on
153. For example, in describing rights over local flora and fauna—and the genetic 
resources thereof—Merges has speculated that “strong property rights” might “enhance 
developing country autonomy and environmental goals.”  Robert P. Merges, Rainforest 
Preservation: Problems with the Property Rights Approach 3 (1995) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Robert P. Merges).
154. See, e.g., David B. Jordan, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Domestic Intellectual
Property Law and Native American Economic and Cultural Policy: Can It Fit?, 25 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 93, 99 (2000–2001) (“The American copyright system stumbles as it
attempts to protect ‘group’ rights that lack either identification of any actual original 
author, or alternatively, the requisite intent to enter into a legal relationship to create a
joint or collective work.”).
 155. RADIN, supra note 25, at 70. 
156. Id. (citing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)). 
157. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D) (2006). This is the Native American Graves Protection
and Repatriation Act, which prohibits sale or purchase of Native American human
remains or cultural items acquired without proper authority; the Act can also force 
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full-blown group personality interests, we can protect the personality
interests of individuals within that group through protection of the group’s 
interests.  Yet just as exclusionary zoning—the Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas case—is a difficult question between people’s freedom to migrate 
and people’s freedom to form and maintain cohesive communities,158 
protection of TK/TCE—at least when it is used to forbid outsiders from 
using the TK/TCE—presents a balance between some people developing 
their own personhood through free migration in thought and expression
as against other people’s freedom to protection of their personhood 
interests through maintenance of cohesive expressive communities. 
D.  Privacy Justifications and TK/TCE
Privacy justifications for exclusive rights over TK/TCE also seem like
a promising area.  Of course, such justifications will be limited to
TK/TCE that is genuinely kept out of the possession of outsiders. When
a tribal ritual, sanctuary, or sacred writing is unquestionably kept from 
outsiders, this is easy.  But when some members of a community want to 
disclose or share with outsiders, thorny issues can arise.159 
The analogous causes of action in traditional common law jurisdictions 
include trade secrecy—commonly, although not uniformly, considered 
part of intellectual property—protection of confidential information, 
breach of confidence, and straightforward invasion of privacy claims.
Indeed, many of the elaborations of an invasion of privacy in American 
law would map reasonably well onto situations in which secret TK/TCE 
is disclosed and disseminated outside an indigenous people or local 
community.160 The principal modification that is required is to move from
the protection of an individual person, including a corporation as a 
juridical person, to the protection of a more amorphously but still discretely
defined group.  For reasons I have explained in Part IV.B above, I think 
158. An observation made by Radin.  RADIN, supra note 25, at 97. 
 159. CRYSTAL, supra note 6, at 157 (“Some elders . . . do not want to tell their stories;
and even if they do, their relatives or community groups may dispute their right to tell 
them, or refuse to allow other people to use them.  The ancestral language may be viewed
as sacred.”).
160. In the United States, the right of privacy may be invaded by an “(a) unreasonable 
intrusion upon the seclusion of another[,] . . . (b) appropriation of the other’s name or 
likeness, . . . (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, . . . or (d) publicity
that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.” RESTATEMENT 

























     





   
   
that such a move is not difficult and in fact, at least one common law
court has agreed.161 
Another conceptual challenge here is that many advocates of TK/TCE
protection conflate private with sacred.  Although we can assume that
those rituals, events, and artifacts that a community keeps private are of 
greater value—and may often be the equivalent in that society of
sacred—there is much that is sacred that is not private, as any Catholic 
can attest.  Perhaps more important, we can develop reasonably objective
criteria for what is private, but the call from some demandeurs that
sacred TK/TCE receive heightened protection has, as a counterpoint, the
claim from other demandeurs that all TK/TCE is sacred. 
V. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND TK/TCE
In the scholarly discourse explaining and justifying intellectual property,
the concepts of fairness and desert are given little attention, if not 
outright short shrift.  Yet there is no question that they have been and
remain powerful notions in the daily intellectual property work of courts 
and legislators.162 
On those occasions when fairness issues have come to the front and 
center of scholarly discussions, it is usually as a critique of intellectual 
property rights—limiting or conditioning intellectual property is seen as
the means to promote distributive justice.163  At the international level,
161. For example, in Foster v Mountford (1976) 29 FLR 233, 235, an Australian
court used the common law doctrine of confidential information to prevent the
publication of a book containing information on sites and objects that had been revealed
to the anthropologist in confidence and held that the publication of such information 
would amount to a breach of confidence. 
162. For example, the earliest state copyright acts often spoke in terms that 
combined natural rights and incentive arguments. See THORVALD SOLBERG, COPYRIGHT 
ENACTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1783–1906, at 11–15, 18–20, 25–31 (1906) (state 
laws for Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, North 
Carolina, and Rhode Island).  Even when recognizing that the “reward” of copyright is
an end to a means, the Supreme Court has noted that “[s]acrificial days devoted to such 
creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.”  Mazer v. 
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 
576 (1977) (quoting Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219).  This point was also repeated by many lower
courts. See also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE 
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 3–6 (1961) (recognizing that a purpose
of copyright is “[t]o give authors the reward due them for their contribution to society”). 
Intellectual property laws in other countries similarly have powerful fairness underpinnings.
For example, Andre Lucas, the author of France’s best known treatise on copyright law, 
once remarked, “No far-reaching regulation on unfair competition exists in France.
Otherwise patent and copyright law would be superfluous.”  EUMETSAT, 1ST EUMETSAT 
WORKSHOP ON LEGAL PROTECTION OF METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE DATA 11 (1991). 
163. See, e.g., Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright, Property, and the Right To Deny, 68
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concerns for justice, broadly understood, also seem to motivate action
that limits intellectual property or curbs its impact.  The 2001 Doha 
Declaration164 and the 2005 extension of the period for least developed 
countries to bring their laws into TRIPS compliance might count.165 
But as Peter Menell observed a few years ago, “[t]he most concrete
manifestation of distributive justice principles in the intellectual property
field are recent international accords with regard to the protection, 
ownership and use of resources.”166  Those undertakings—the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD), the CBD’s recent Nagoya Protocol,167 
and work at the Food & Agricultural Organization on access and use of
germplasms—are antecedents to the IGC’s discussion of genetic resources 
and patenting. 
In that IGC discussion of genetic resources and patenting, demandeurs
seek to condition the validity of patents on inventions using genetic 
resources on the disclosure of the genetic resources, prior informed
consent in obtaining the genetic resources, and adequate benefit sharing
with the territory from which or people from whom the genetic resources 
came.  In this sense, the claim of developing countries for a share of the
proceeds from patented technologies derived from genetic resources, and
associated TK, is directly parallel to the distributive justice claims in
domestic disputes that individual persons deserve a cut of the proceeds
of patented technologies derived from cell lines.168 
materials); William M. Landes, Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries, and Other 
Unpublished Works: An Economic Approach, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 79 (1992). 
164. WTO, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm.  The Doha Declaration expanded the 
capacity of countries to use compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents in the face of
“national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency,” expressly identifying 
“HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.” Id. at para. 5(c). 
165. See Press Release, World Trade Organization, Poorest Countries Given More
Time To Apply Intellectual Property Rules (Nov. 29, 2005), available at http://www.wto. 
org/english/news_e/pres05_e/pr424_e.htm. 
 166. Menell, supra note 13, at 160. 
167. Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from the Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
Oct. 29, 2010, available at http://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf. 
168. A focal point for this issue was the California Supreme Court’s decision in 
Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).  For discussions
of human cells being used without prior informed consent, see BOYLE, supra note 43, at 
21–24, 98–107 (discussing Moore case); REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF 
HENRIETTA LACKS (2010) (discussing HeLa cell line); and Justin Hughes, The Personality













    
 
    
 




   
     
 
    
 
 
   
   
    
 
    
   
A.  The Redistributive Power of “New” Property in TK/TCE 
It is fair to say that distributive justice concerns are implicitly front
and center in the TK/TCE discussions but in the opposite way from the 
genetic resources debate: the TK/TCE discussion is about establishing 
new intellectual property rights as a way to redistribute wealth.169  And 
this implicit issue or claim is something we need to treat respectfully, 
particularly because, as Molly Torsen and Jane Anderson note, “[i]ndigenous 
and traditional communities are generally among the poorest and most 
disadvantaged in the world.”170  Of course, there are many theories of 
redistributive justice,171 and the only one I will attempt to explore here is
a Rawlsian approach. 
Readers of these symposium pages will be well acquainted with John 
Rawls’s A Theory of Justice and his overarching system built on just two 
principles.  Rawls’s first principle is that “[e]ach person has an equal 
right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible
81, 168–72 (1998) (discussing Moore case).  Indeed, the modern, full concept of prior 
informed consent had its start in American medical malpractice law.  See Salgo v. Leland
Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).  See generally Jay
M. Zitter, Annotation, Recovery for Nonconsensual Human Medical Experimentation, 42
A.L.R.6th 301 (2009).  In the 1980s and 1990s, the concept of free, prior informed 
consent migrated into public international law discussions as a tool to protect indigenous 
people, both on issues like displacement from tracts of land and in regards to TK/TCE.
See generally Robert Goodland, Free, Prior and Informed Consent and the World Bank 
Group, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Summer 2004, at 66, 66–67; Daniel Barstow 
Magraw & Lauren Baker, Globalization, Communities and Human Rights: Community-
Based Property Rights and Prior Informed Consent, 35 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 413, 
421–22 (2007); Anne Perrault, Facilitating Prior Informed Consent in the Context of
Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Summer
2004, at 21. 
169. For example, the preamble of the August 2012 IGC text recites that one of its
purposes is to “promote the equitable sharing of benefits arising from their use.”  WIPO,
Intergovernmental Committee, supra note 106, at 3; see also Hansen, supra note 4, at 
761 (describing TK/TCE protection as intended to “to correct North-South information
and economic inequity”); id. at 775 (“The motivations . . . are those of equity in intellectual 
property ownership and economic development . . . .”). 
170. Molly Torsen & Jane Anderson, WIPO, Intellectual Property and the Safeguarding
of Traditional Cultures: Legal Issues and Practical Options for Museums, Libraries and
Archives, at 14, WIPO Pub. No. 1023(E) (2010), available at http://www.wipo.int/free 
publications/en/tk/1023/wipo_pub_1023.pdf; see also Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 4 (2001) (describing indigenous 
people as characteristically living “under conditions of severe disadvantage relative to
others within the states constructed around them”). 
171. See, e.g., G.A. COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 2 (2008) (theory of 
distributive justice in which people’s material wealth prospects are roughly equal and
distributive justice questions arise for both state and private individuals in their daily 
lives); PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL: WHAT (IF ANYTHING) CAN JUSTIFY 
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with a similar scheme of liberties for all.”172 In itself, this is unremarkable; 
indeed, with a bit of polish and color it is not so different from things
that world leaders say all the time.  But Rawls’s vision of a just society 
is marked by, among many things, another principle commonly called
the “difference principle.”  The difference principle addresses both 
distributive equity and productive efficiency, stating that “[s]ocial and
economic inequalities [must be of] . . . the greatest benefit [to] the least 
advantaged [members of society].”173  This distribution of resources 
governs what Rawls calls “primary goods,” which include “rights, liberties, 
and opportunities, . . . income and wealth,” and the “social bases of self-
respect.”174  Much of Rawls’s profound influence stems from this simple
justification of economic incentives: inequalities related to productive 
efficiency are allowed and defended as long as they work to improve the 
lot of the “worst-off” class in the society. 
Every critical piece of the Rawlsian machinery has been debated for 
decades.  For example, the primary goods list can be understood narrowly 
in the sense of consumptive goods and services or more broadly, in 
Amartya Sen’s words, as “the general-purpose means for the pursuit of
one’s comprehensive goals.”175  And quite a few well-meaning people
modify Rawls’s framework without Sen’s rigor.  One of the ways Rawlsian 
justice is most abused and misunderstood is through vague or loose 
understandings of the worst-off class.  The worst-off class used in our 
calculations of justice should be a group with stable characteristics.176 
The most obvious candidate is the poorest class economically, although 
 172. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 291 (1993). 
 173. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 118, at 266. 
174. Id. at 54. 
 175. SEN, supra note 1, at 64.  For Sen, primary goods are best understood as 
“capabilities”—capabilities for living the life one chooses to live. Id. at 66.  He believes
that “primary goods are, at best, means to valued ends of human life” and “merely means 
to other things, in particular freedom.”  Id. at 234. 
176. When making judgments from the original position, Rawls is clear that the 
least advantaged are not identifiable this way.  JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: 
A RESTATEMENT § 17.3, at 59 n.26 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) (“The least advantaged are 
never identifiable as men or women, say, or as whites or blacks, or Indians or British.
They are not individuals identified by natural or other features . . . .  Rather, the worst off 
under any scheme of cooperation are simply the individuals who are worst off under that
particular scheme.”).  Nonetheless, Rawls recognizes that later stable characteristics of 
groups may be used to judge the comparative justice of different arrangements.  See, e.g.,
id. § 18.6, at 66 (“[W]hen used in a certain way, distinctions of gender and race [may] 
















   
  









    
   
 
one can debate how large a slice to use; one can also imagine worst-off
classes based on other metrics, such as long-term disabilities.  But a 
worst-off class is not people suffering from headaches at 10:00 a.m.
today or people who went to Vegas and lost everything.
Within the range of reasonable interpretations of primary goods and
worst-off groups, the incentive-to-innovate, the incentive-to-disseminate, 
and the incentive-to-preserve justifications for intellectual property can 
all fit with the difference principle in the sense that the monopoly rents 
brought to inventors, authors, and the people who bankroll them make
everyone better off, including the worst-off class.  There is much to be 
explored about all this,177 but the general argument is that the differences
in incomes introduced by the intellectual property system are justified by
the benefits brought to everyone, including the worst off. 
But what kind of Rawlsian distributive justifications can we make for 
establishing, here and now, legal protection for TK/TCE?  Rawls’s initial 
vision was laid out in terms of the ex ante formulation of just institutions 
for a self-contained society, and there is a cottage industry critiquing
Rawls’s subsequent efforts to extend his vision of justice to the international 
level.  It seems to me that if we are to use Rawls’s ideas here, we should 
put to one side his awkward expansion of his system of justice to a 
proto-Westphalian world.  Instead, we should concentrate on Sen’s 
observation that “Rawls’s formulation of the difference principle . . . gives 
us ground[s] enough to rank other alternatives in terms of the respective 
advantages of the worst-off.”178  In “a cross-border ‘public framework of
thought’”179 that does not rely on a presumed social contract, we should
rank our present circumstances—the existing international and national
legal systems of intellectual property—against an alternative that would be
the same legal systems of intellectual property with the addition of the 
best system of TK/TCE protection we believe we can reasonably obtain 
in the current political circumstances.
On that basis, I think we can reason as follows: if we assume that the 
recipients of any economic rents from the TK/TCE protection will be
177. Indeed, one could make some interesting arguments about intellectual property
enforcement from the Rawlsian perspective, for example, that an enforcement system 
focused on the middle and upper rungs of the society while permitting a more rampant
level of piracy at the lower levels give the inventors/authors unequal rewards in order to
make the poorest citizens better off. 
 178. SEN, supra note 1, at 97.  Sen stresses that a vision of ideal distributive justice
is not required to make binary comparisons.  Id. at 102 (“There would be something 
deeply odd in a general belief that a comparison of any two alternatives cannot be sensibly
made without a prior identification of a supreme alternative.  There is no analytical connection 
there at all.”).
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sufficiently “among the poorest and most disadvantaged in the world”180 
and that we can treat them as a worst-off group for moral considerations, 
then a palpable moral case can be made for some kind of TK/TCE 
protection beyond protecting that which is secret or private (and would 
not therefore be a direct source of further goods in a market exchange 
economy).  In financial terms, the TK/TCE protection would shift a 
relatively small amount of wealth from other groups to a worst-off group.
It also can be used to keep a small amount of wealth from shifting 
away from them.  One concern—discussed implicitly or explicitly—is
whether most indigenous peoples or local communities would be in a 
reasonable position to develop or commercialize the protected TK/TCE
outside the community.  But much TK/TCE is commercially exploited by 
the community, as when Hopi Indians make and sell kachina dolls, 
Aboriginals make and sell dream paintings, and Laotian silkweavers 
make tapestries with traditional patterns.  These are just a few examples
of the many situations in which indigenous people and local communities 
have arts and crafts production systems that bring in outside capital
through exports—either regular exports or sales to tourists, who carry out 
the products. 
As Torsen notes, “TCEs can be economic resources that concretely 
contribute to providing livelihoods and easing poverty and socio-
economic disadvantage for these communities, for example, through 
craft marketing.”181  Many of these groups have faced stiff competition 
from Asian industries copying the arts and crafts styles and then flooding 
international markets—including supplying tourist shops in the indigenous
people’s home country.  So, we need to entertain seriously how TK/TCE 
protection may help indigenous people and local communities retain
production bases that might otherwise be lost. 
The kind of redistribution that would happen with an effective TK/TCE 
regime would at best be small, slow, and sporadic.  This is not the sort 
of ad hoc move toward redistributive justice that Sen would advocate to 
avoid catastrophe through “calamitous inaction” (as with the case of a 
famine that can be averted).182 
180. Torsen & Anderson, supra note 170, at 14. 
181. Id.
 182. SEN, supra note 1, at 47.  Sen makes the persuasive case that it is usually easy
to thwart famines.  He reasons that “[t]he relatively small redistribution of the food supply that
























   
 
    
In terms of redistributive effect, we should also emphasize that while
everyone may have rights over TK/TCE, only a few will have valuable 
TK/TCE.  Among those who advocate for new or stronger forms of 
intellectual property rights, there is a mistaken, if not sometimes 
disingenuous, conflation of new legal rights and new economic wealth. 
But the abstract prospect of benefit sharing for genetic resources, TK, or
TCE will do little when a local community or indigenous people are 
faced with hard choices related to poverty.183 
B.  Economic Rents to Beneficiaries—The Practical          
Problem of Getting This To Work 
Earlier, I described one of the four fundamental debates about TK/TCE 
protection being the beneficiaries of TK/TCE protection.  This is where 
the discussion veers sharply from a simple North/South debate.  The
indigenous groups and local communities involved in the GRTKF 
discussions clearly want the beneficiaries of protection to be themselves.184 
These groups are generally supported by nongovernmental organizations 
and New World countries that have developed express systems for
recognizing, however imperfectly, indigenous peoples’ rights—Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, and the United States.185 
In contrast, a number of countries want national governments to both 
control and be the beneficiaries for all TK/TCE located within their
national borders.  This point of view has a long pedigree, dating back to 
at least the Tunis Model Law.  Indeed, over the decades there has been a 
movement from the assumption that national governments should control 
TK/TCE to an increasing realization that control should vest with the 
concerned indigenous people or local community.186 
for those deprived of all incomes, through one calamity or another, which is typically the 
primary cause of starvation.” Id. at 48. 
183. Merges has also made this point.  Merges, supra note 153, at 1 (“Granting strong 
property rights over the discovery of new plants and animals, or genetic features of them,
will not by itself end the destruction of rainforests and other habitats.”).
184. See, e.g., 1993 Mataatua Declaration, supra note 89, pmbl., at 2 (“Insist that 
the first beneficiaries of indigenous knowledge (cultural and intellectual property rights)
must be the direct indigenous descendants of such knowledge . . . .”); id. § 2.1
(“Recognise that indigenous peoples are the guardians of their customary knowledge and
have the right to protect and control dissemination of that knowledge.”); id. § 2.4
(“Accept that the cultural and intellectual property rights of indigenous people are vested 
in those who created them.”).
185. Many other countries also have laws recognizing that TK/TCE should be owned or 
controlled by indigenous people and local communities.  See, e.g., The Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997, Rep. Act. No. 8371 (1997) (Phil.), available at http://www.
doe.gov.ph/ER/pdf/RA%208371.pdf. 
186. See, e.g., Kutty, supra note 5, at 22 (describing a survey the author conducted
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As a practical matter, this has a powerful impact on our ability to 
justify TK/TCE protections.  Although revenue from TK/TCE protection 
flowing into central government coffers might still serve as an incentive 
to preserve or even an incentive to distribute, such monies surely cannot
serve as incentives to create if the benefits never reach the creators.  
More importantly, if revenues, or the benefits thereof, never reach the 
indigenous people or local community that is the source of the TK/TCE, 
there is no redistributive justification based on indigenous peoples being 
likely worst-off groups.  Monies that remain in the capital are less likely 
to make the worst-off better off. 
On this count, it is troubling that the postcolonial history of many
developing countries has included elites—urban and connected to the 
government—extracting disproportionate amounts of the national wealth 
through control of external trade.  This problem has arguably been worst
where the resource being traded can be produced with a small workforce 
relative to the overall population, such as oil and diamonds—what Leif 
Wenar and others have called the “resource curse.”187 
But the same problem—wealth being channeled away from the worst 
off—“can be seen in the troubling history many developing countries 
have had with centralized agricultural management in which government 
authorities have extracted economic rents from small farmers, particularly 
for key cash crops.”188  For example, in the mid-1980s, Ghana cocoa
elements constituting folklore should vest with the concerned communities themselves. . . . 
A few of those responded in favour of a special trust, established by the community, for 
the purpose of exercising their rights.”). 
 187. Leif Wenar, Clean Trade in Natural Resources, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 27 (2011); 
Leif Wenar, Property Rights and the Resource Curse, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2 (2008). 
 188. Justin Hughes, Coffee and Chocolate—Can We Help Developing Country 
Farmers Through Geographical Indications? (Sept. 29, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1684370 (describing
how coffee and cocoa commodity boards have extracted disproportionate economic rents 
in many African countries); see also GEORGE B.N. AYITTEY, AFRICA UNCHAINED: THE 
BLUEPRINT FOR AFRICA’S FUTURE 74 (2005) (“Marketing boards, for example, were set 
up during the colonial era with the declared purpose to protect small African peasant
producers from the vagaries of the world market.  Marketing boards fixed prices well 
below world market levels, and the difference was to be used for the purpose of rural 
development.”); id. at 69, 133 (describing Kenya’s establishment of state monopolies 
over maize, tea, meat, and other food crops and state produce-buying agencies of other
African countries); ROBERT H. BATES, MARKETS AND STATES IN TROPICAL AFRICA: THE 
POLITICAL BASIS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 109–10 (1981) (viewing state bureaucracies 
as predatory on agricultural producers and markets); JOEL GLENN BRENNER, THE EMPERORS
OF CHOCOLATE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF HERSHEY AND MARS 238 (1999) (“The
























   
  
     
 
     
   
 
 
farmers were receiving less than 10% of the world price of cocoa while 
the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board spent the 90% of the world market price 
it collected elsewhere.189  Between 1960 and 1990, Côte d’Ivoire’s Caisse 
de Stabilisation et de Soutien des Prix des Produits Agricoles sold that
country’s coffee and cocoa production on world markets at market prices 
while paying local farmers only a small percentage of the market price;
from 1984 through 1985, Cote d’Ivoire farmers received only 37% of the 
world market prices for their production.190 
The experience in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire with cocoa is not unique; 
as Benoit Daviron and Stefano Ponte point out, in countries that have 
had centralized coffee marketing authorities, “[p]ayments to farmers
were often late and resources were siphoned off the system at various 
levels.”191  Andrew Dorward and a team of researchers described the
sub-Saharan commodity board problem more directly:
[P]arastatals . . . were generally part of a bloated and inefficient state apparatus
that was inefficient and ineffective in serving the agricultural sector and at the
same time an enormous drain on government resources.  These difficulties of
parastatals were compounded by, and associated with, wider problems in macro-
economic management.192 
Even when African governments began to liberalize their agricultural 
commodity markets in the 1980s, neither the flow of revenue to farmers 
nor the transparency of institutions necessarily improved.193 
Perhaps this is not the sort of discussion one expects to see in the 
context of philosophical justifications for a genre of intellectual property,
but this must surely be part of our “determining whether a particular social 
change would enhance justice.”194  The troubling experience of some 
developing countries with extractive resources and others with cash
crops should be instructive because GRTKF share characteristics with
each.  Genetic resources from local plants and animals may be the closest in
countries.  Although the board receives market price for their beans, they pay farmers 
only a fraction of what they earn, often less than half the world price.”); TONY KILLICK, 
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS IN ACTION: A STUDY OF ECONOMIC POLICIES IN GHANA 48 
(1978) (establishment of cocoa board in colonial Ghana). 
189. See  AYITTEY, supra note 188, at 133, 135 (describing the Cocoa Marketing
Board’s use of cocoa profits for personal gain at the expense of cocoa farmers’ welfare).
190. Pascal Wick & Jane S. Shaw, The Cote d’Ivoire’s Troubled Economy: Why
World Bank Intervention Failed, 18 CATO J. 11, 12–13 (1998). 
 191. BENOIT DAVIRON & STEFANO PONTE, THE COFFEE PARADOX: GLOBAL MARKETS,
COMMODITY TRADE, AND THE ELUSIVE PROMISE OF DEVELOPMENT 102 (2005). 
 192. ANDREW DORWARD ET AL., CTR. FOR DEV. & POVERTY REDUCTION, IMPERIAL
COLL. LONDON, AGRICULTURAL LIBERALISATION IN SUB SAHARAN AFRICA, at ii (2004), 
available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/PDF/Outputs/ECPREP/AgriculturalLiberalisation 
AfricaFinalReport.pdf. 
 193. See Hughes, supra note 188 (manuscript at 48–49), and sources cited therein.
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form to an extractive asset like petroleum or titanium—a central government 
can sign them away with little or no consultation with local communities.
The same can be said for some forms of folklore.  On the other hand,
transmission of TK or performance-based TCE, like dance, may be closer to
cash crops that require substantial numbers of local participants. 
Separate from a central government’s financial exploitation of TCE, 
there is the problem of whether central control of indigenous peoples’ 
TCE is used to protect or suppress.  Large countries with dominant 
cultures yet strong, geographically distinct ethnicities may see central 
administration of indigenous peoples and local communities’ TCE as a 
means to ensure that the TCE is both protected and nonthreatening. 
Motives may be mixed; in the real world, they usually are. 
To be fair, it can reasonably be argued that as a practical matter,
governments will have to provide a role safeguarding and administering
the TK/TCE.  Proposals have expressly reflected this possibility.  The 
problem is that there is a fine line between a national government 
administering or being a guardian of protected TK/TCE and that
government being the de facto owner of the protected TK/TCE.  On this 
count, the experience of states that do have forms of intellectual property
for TK/TCE is not encouraging.  There is little or no evidence that
significant monies are collected and little or no evidence that any money
ever trickles down to the indigenous peoples or local communities. 
Looking at the situation in Ghana, Boateng concludes: “[I]f there is one 
compelling argument to be made for treating ethnic culture as national 
culture under intellectual property law, it is that under this set of
arrangements, when it comes to the ability to claim royalties for their 
cultural production, all ethnicities are equally dispossessed.”195  If we are
trying to do the right thing for indigenous people and local communities, 
the danger of creating a system in which these people are dispossessed is
real.  How we avoid that danger must be part of what Benjamin Franklin
called the “prudential algebra” of government.196 
 195. BOATENG, supra note 100, at 125. 
196. See U.S. BUREAU OF EDUC., 2 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN AND THE UNIVERSITY OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 152 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1893) (quoting Letter from Benjamin 










   
   




   








C.  Other Redistributive Concerns—The Additional Problems          
When This Does Work
Of course, we must also map out the redistributive effects on other 
groups besides the worst off who are recipients of payments, that is, effects 
beyond some primary goods shifting from non-worst-off to some worst-
off.  The problems here further cloud the value of TK/TCE protection as 
a means to make the worst-off class better off. 
First, because the TK/TCE protection does not work as an incentive to 
create or an incentive to distribute, it does not make the other groups 
better off in the way that rewarding Tim Burton or Ang Lee makes tens 
of millions of filmgoers better off.  It might make the other groups in
society better off if it produces effective incentives to preserve TK/TCE
that would otherwise be lost, in the full sense of preservation as discussed 
above. 
Second, and more worrying, is the fact that some groups will have 
more valuable TK/TCE than others: some groups will be better at marketing
their TK/TCE than others, and some groups will simply be luckier in
having their TK/TCE draw the attention of motivated outsiders. Allowing
local communities to profit directly and uniquely from their own TK/TCE 
risks establishing or worsening inequalities among indigenous groups; it 
would do this precisely because legal protection of TK/TCE would bring 
these intangibles into the casino of intellectual property, a crapshoot in
which most products do not profit much but some profit massively.  In
other words, the more successful the TK/TCE protection is, the worse the
generated inequalities could become.  As Ostergard, Tubin, and Dikirr 
reason, the influx of payment “to a single group within a state establishes 
the potential for further destabilisation or, at a minimum, exacerbation of 
the inequality problems that have plagued African states during the post-
colonial period.”197 
A third effect of locating control and economic rents from TK/TCE 
with the relevant indigenous groups is that we may undermine another 
use for TK/TCE: the desire and need of modern states, particularly in 
Africa, to “harness their indigenous cultural and intellectual property to 
help consolidate state and national identity.”198  The gaucho and the cowboy
are iconic to Argentine and American culture respectively, but they
began as regional TCE within each national polity.  Indeed, national 
identity has always been built from local bits and pieces.
Yet even if we acknowledge that this sort of “nation building” through
TCE remains a legitimate interest, if we cannot state principles that 
197. Ostergard et al., supra note 37, at 330–31. 
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separate the positive harnessing of TK/TCE from its inappropriate 
exploitation, then we may have a zero sum game in which we must choose
between nation builders and local communities. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Discussions on international legal norms for the protection of TK/TCE 
have, in their contemporary form, been ongoing since the late 1990s.  In 
that time, our understanding of key issues for a workable system— 
subject matter, beneficiaries, rights, or protections—have advanced little, 
if at all.  Indeed, as Michael Brown has observed, “vexing questions of
origins and boundaries . . . are commonly swept under the rug in public 
discussions.”199 Yet even if all those questions were settled, we also need a
clear justification or justifications for a new form of intellectual property
on the world stage.
Most of the traditional justifications for intellectual property fit uneasily
on TK/TCE, but some foundations are possible.  Justifications based on 
privacy, personality interests, incentives to preserve, and distributive 
justice all seem potentially viable if properly refined.  Among these 
possible foundations for TK/TCE protection, distributive justice is the 
one we traditionally discuss the least in intellectual property circles.
International legal norms for the protection of TK/TCE would be, at best, 
only a small tool for distributive justice.  But a small economic effect 
may still address a manifest injustice, and we should, whenever we can,
be committed to “removing manifest injustices that can be identified
by public reasoning, with a good deal of partial accord.”200 
Indeed, properly understood these justifications tend to meld together. 
Jobs in local arts and crafts that are retained or resuscitated through TCE
protection serve both to preserve traditions and distribute wealth that
might have otherwise gone elsewhere.  Participating in the process of 
creating and disseminating TCE arts and crafts can serve significant
personhood and identity interests—interests beyond the cash payments
we might make if we were concerned only with distribution of wealth.201 
 199. MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? 7 (2003). 
 200. SEN, supra note 1, at 262. 
201. I consider this akin to Sunder’s observation that “[a] broader understanding of
intellectual property,” as both an end and means of development, 
recognizes the importance not just of producing more knowledge goods, but 
also of participating in the process of knowledge creation. . . .  To be sure, this 




   
 
 
For those who are discouraged by the decade-plus of WIPO discussions, 
we should remember Sen’s admonition that “we have good reason to be 
sceptical of the possibility of ‘discussionless justice.’”202  But we also 
have good reason to be frustrated with diplomats and policymakers who
sweep the “vexing questions” under the rug.  Those concerned about 
traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions—whatever
their perspective—need to engage in a more frank discussion of what is 
being sought, what is needed, and what is possible. 
of new intellectual property rights, awarding private control over resources
once thought to be in the public domain. 
Sunder, supra note 79, at 122–23. 
 202. SEN, supra note 1, at 89. 
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